 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
PETERSON v. UTAH FARM BUREAU INS. CO.10/31/1996
N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1991) (same, UIM benefits); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 54 Ohio St.3d 61, 562 N.E.2d 132 (1990) (same, UM benefits); Cope v. West Am. Ins. Co., 95 Or. App. 114, 768 P.2d 410 (1989) (same, UIM benefits), aff'd, 309 Or. 232, 785 P.2d 1050 (1990); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Dodson, 235 Va. 346, 367 S.E.2d 505 (1988) (same, UM benefits); Sayan v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 43 Wn. App. 148, 716 P.2d 895 (1986) (same, UM benefits). After analyzing several cases consistent with the majority view, the Hawaii court held that the "clear and unambiguous language 'legally entitled to recover' " appearing in its UM statute precluded the insured's recovery under the UM clause of his auto policy. Royston, 817 P.2d at 122; see also Perkins v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 799 F.2d 955, 962 (5th Cir. 1986) (regarding "legally entitled to recover" language "simply too unambiguous to admit of judicially created exception"). Nonetheless, the Hawaii court conceded that the insured's
recovery of workers' compensation benefits will not fully compensate him for the injuries received as a result of the accident. However, under the circumstances of this case, we simply see no intent on the part of the legislature to allow recovery of benefits under both the workers' compensation and uninsured motorist statutes. Under the current state of the law, such recovery is precluded and can only be afforded by legislative action amending the [insurance code].
Royston, 817 P.2d at 123. We agree with the Hawaii court's observation that the state legislature is the most appropriate forum in which to address this issue arising from the "legally entitled to recover" language used by both UIM and UM statutes and parroted in automobile insurance policy clauses.
Accordingly, we hold that Farm Bureau's "obligation to perform, under the express terms of its contract with . . . [Peterson, does] not arise until there . . . a legal determination of the liability of the [under-]insured motorist and the extent of the damages sustained," Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745, and that a judgment favorable to Peterson is necessary to fix Farm Bureau's contractual duty to satisfy that judgment. The Workers'
Compensation Act prevents Peterson from satisfying this requirement.
Peterson asserts, however, that the language of Utah Code Ann. ยง 31A-22-305(9)(b) (1994) demonstrates the Utah Legislature's "intent that [UIM benefits] actually be paid." The specific language Peterson relies on states that UIM "coverage . . . shall be added to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured person." Id. (emphasis added). However, the supreme court's interpretation of the language "legally entitled to recover" in effect preempts the language of section 31A-22-305(9)(b) because, under that interpretation, there is no way to determine even the amount to be "added," "combined," or "stacked upon."
Because of our holding today, we do not reach Farm Bureau's alternate challenge that Peterson failed to show that he has exhausted the limits of liability of any bodily injury policies Clifford may have had on his vehicle at the time of the accident.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's grant of Farm Bureau's summary judgment motion because the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act forecloses Peterson's ability to establish amounts he is legally entitled to recover, if any, thereby relieving Farm Bureau of any obligation to provide UIM coverage under Peterson's Farm Bureau automobile insurance policy.
BENCH an
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Utah Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|