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Rhodes v. Martinez9/6/1996
consideration of your past and future services, I give a lien for your legal fee and advanced costs and expenses against the proceeds of my claim.
The contract clearly states that Rhodes is hiring Camacho to represent him for "all claims I may have arising out of the above accident." No exception is made for any type of claim. Therefore the contract applies to personal injury , property damage, and any other claims Rhodes might have had arising out of the accident specified in the contract. See .
{11} Walters is a case in point where the extent of the representation and the scope of the attorney's lien were defined broadly by description of the accident and not just by the specific claim. In Walters, Wally Joe Walters, minor son of Herman Walters (Walters), was a passenger in a car driven by his cousin, Mannelyn Hastings. Wally Joe suffered serious injuries on March 1, 1969, in a collision with a car driven by Mr. Spiller. . Walters contracted with attorney James L. Brown on a contingency basis for representation "'in connection with the accident and resultant injuries and damages which we have discussed.'" Id. Brown negotiated a settlement with Spiller's insurance carrier, out of which he received the fee that was due him. Id. Brown then recommended Walters approach Hastings' insurance carrier. Walters declined to do so, on account of the close family relationship. . Instead, Walters fired Brown and negotiated with Hastings' carrier directly. Id. Brown asserted a lien over any proceeds recovered from Hastings' insurance company. Id. Walters argued the original contingency agreement covered only claims against Spiller.
{12} The Supreme Court construed the ambiguous phrase "'which we have discussed,'" according to "'the undisputed evidence,'" to refer to the accident occurring on March 1, 1969, and resulting injuries and damages to the son and to the father. . Thus understood, "the contract . . . covered all claims arising from the accident and the resultant injuries and damages including the Hastings' claim." Id. Further, "there was no substantial evidence of any justification in discharging Mr. Brown for his counsel regarding the Hastings' claim." . "An attorney discharged without cause is entitled to recover the stipulated fee on the happening of the contingency." . Brown was allowed to collect his contingency fee on funds recovered from the Hastings' insurer.
{13} In the case at bar, the trial court did not find that Camacho had been discharged for cause. No such finding was requested. As in Walters, the Rhodes-Camacho contract does not limit itself to any particular part of Rhodes' claim. We hold that Camacho's attorney's lien validly attached to all the proceeds of the personal injury settlement.
{14} The Branch firm asserts that an attorney's charging lien only reaches funds created by that attorney's efforts, citing , and cases from other jurisdictions. In Thompson, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a suit brought by attorney James A. Thompson to enforce a charging lien because of lack of notice. . Thompson failed to file his lien with the court in the underlying lawsuit. He also failed to give notice of his claimed lien to the potential judgment debtor or his own clients. . The Court added that Thompson improperly sought to enforce his lien in "an independent action after the funds been disposed of."
{15} Camacho properly filed his lien in the underlying lawsuit before the Branch firm entered its appearance and later mailed a copy to the Branch firm. There is no assertion that Camacho gave inadequate notice of his claim.
{16} Thompson, however, does not prohibit the attorney and client from
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