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HIGUERA v. HIESTAND6/19/1996
This medical malpractice case involves questions relating to the jury selection procedures employed by Fremont County, and the appropriate standard to apply in passing upon a motion for new trial.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent, Dr. Hiestand, is a physician who practices in Ashton, Idaho. The appellant, Luis Higuera, was seen by Dr. Hiestand for a medical problem which Higuera contends was misdiagnosed. A minor surgical procedure performed by Dr. Hiestand resulted in physical complications for Higuera, who then filed the present medical malpractice case.
Prior to trial, Higuera received a list of potential jurors and apparently noted at that time that there were no people with Hispanic surnames on the list. During voir dire, Higuera's attorney asked questions relating to whether any of the potential jurors were Hispanic, and asked whether anyone was related to an Hispanic. Although he received a positive response to the latter question from two potential jurors, he did not inquire further as to the nature of the relationships. Higuera ultimately passed all of the jurors for cause and accepted them to sit as a panel. The case went to trial and, on May 18, 1993, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Hiestand.
Higuera timely filed a motion for new trial, alleging that Fremont County's jury selection procedure systematically excluded Hispanic persons in violation of both I.C. § 2-203 and his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to a fair and impartial jury. He also asserted insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict as a separate basis for a
new trial. Higuera appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for new trial.
II.
WHETHER, IF I.C. § 2-213 IS INTERPRETED TO EXCLUDE SEPARATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES, IT EFFECTS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
The district court relied upon I.C. § 2-213 to conclude that when Higuera passed the jury for cause, he waived the exclusive means of challenging Fremont County's jury selection procedures. Section 2-213 provides in relevant part:
(1) Within seven (7) days after the moving party discovered or by the exercise of diligence could have discovered the gounds [grounds] therefor, and in any event before the petit jury is sworn to try the case, a party may move to stay the proceedings . . ., or for other appropriate relief, on the ground of substantial failure to comply with this act in selecting the grand or petit jury.
(3) The procedures prescribed by this section are the exclusive means by which . . . a party in a civil case may challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not selected in conformity with this act.
In this case, there is no question that Higuera failed to comply with the time limitations imposed by § 2-213 since his challenge to the jury selection procedures was made by way of a motion for new trial. It is Higuera's contention, rather, that if § 2-213 is interpreted to preclude his separate constitutional challenges, the application of that provision has resulted in a denial of due process.
The State of Idaho is constitutionally prohibited from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Assuming for the purposes of this opinion that the State has deprived Higuera of a "liberty" or "property" interest, we nevertheless conclude that it has accorded him procedural due process. The fundamental requirements of due process are timely notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. E.g., Matter of Adoption of Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 556, 887 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1995) (citing Sweitzer v. De
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