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Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico5/31/1996
d that the potential for a malpractice suit being filed long after the act of malpractice was one of the reasons that insurance carriers were withdrawing from medical malpractice liability coverage. The legislature's solution--rationally related to alleviating this problem--was to preclude almost all malpractice claims from being brought more than three years after the act of malpractice.
{41} The three-year limit of Section 41-5-13 is also supported by the same arguments that provide a rational basis for other statutes of limitation and repose. As mentioned above, a statute of repose based upon the date the injury is discovered could place the medical profession in the unfair position of litigating stale claims, years and even decades after the act of malpractice. . The limitations period also encourages the patient, once the injury has been discovered, to diligently pursue his or her claim. As we will discuss in the following section, Cummings' error in this case is that she did not take advantage, after her cancer was discovered on February 23, 1990, of the remaining year-and-a-half provided by Section 41-5-13 in which to pursue her claim.
{42} Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have previously found that Section 41-5-13 violates neither the equal protection nor the due process constitutional guarantees. See (finding Section 41-5-13 to be constitutional); (stating that in most circumstances Section 41-5-13 is constitutional); (finding Section 41-5-13 to be constitutional). Though Section 41-5-13 may in some situations seem harsh, it is constitutional.
IV. THE STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR BRINGING A MALPRACTICE CLAIM CAN EXPIRE BEFORE ANY INJURY IS DISCOVERED
{43} Having established the constitutionality of Section 41-5-13, we will now address whether Cummings' malpractice claim is time-barred by this statute.
A. Standard of Review
{44} When interpreting statutes, our responsibility is to search for and give effect to the intent of the legislature. We endeavor to fulfill the statute's objectives. . Our understanding of legislative intent is based primarily on the language of the statute, and we will first consider and apply the plain meaning of such language. . This standard is sometimes called the "plain meaning rule."
{45} Cummings urges us to keep in mind certain limitations to this rule because the plain meaning of Section 41-5-13 more easily supports the Conclusion urged by X-Ray Associates. Cummings is correct in pointing out that this rule does not require a mechanical, literal interpretation of the statutory language. See . It is rare, if not impossible, for any language--statutory or otherwise--to be utterly free from ambiguity. See . We will not rest our Conclusions upon the plain meaning of the language if the intention of the legislature suggests a meaning different from that suggested by the literal language of the law. . If the strict wording of the law suggests an absurd result, we may interpret the statute to avoid such a result. ), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 545, 854 P.2d 872 (1993). When analyzing a statute from a particular statutory act, such as the one we now discuss from the Medical Malpractice Act, we must read the act in its entirety and construe all the provisions together and attempt to view them as a harmonious whole. See . The plain meaning of particular statutory language will sometimes be modified when considered in the context of other statutes from the same act. However, "if the language of a statute is not ambiguous, the literal meaning of the words must be applied."
{46} As we have stated in other opinions, and as we explain below, we do not find any reason in this case to depar
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