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Naftzger v. American Numismatic Society2/1/1996
ORTEGA, J.
This appeal involves an unresolved question of when the three-year limitations period of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (c) commences to run on a cause of action for the return of property stolen before the 1983 amendment to that statute. We hold, as a matter of law, that the cause of action in this case accrued when the owner discovered the identity of the person in possession of the stolen property, and not when the theft occurred. We reverse the judgment and remand.
SUMMARY
Section 338, subdivision (c) imposes a three-year limitations period for actions seeking the return of stolen property. Before 1983, the Legislature left unanswered the general question of whether the cause of action immediately accrues when the theft occurs, or when the owner discovers: (a) the theft, (b) the identity of the thief, or (c) the identity of the person in possession of the stolen property.
In 1983, the Legislature provided a partial answer by amending section 338, subdivision (c) to read that the cause of action does not accrue until the owner, the owner's agent, or the investigating law enforcement agency discovers the whereabouts of the stolen articles, provided that the articles possess historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance. The rare coins at issue in this appeal meet that standard, but they were stolen prior to the effective date of the 1983 amendment. The amended statute does not indicate whether its discovery rule of accrual should be applied retroactively.
In this opinion, we hold, as a matter of law, that there was a discovery rule of accrual implicit in the prior version of section 338, subdivision (c) for the return of stolen property. We conclude that under the prior version of the statute, the cause of action accrued when the owner discovered the identity of the person in possession of the stolen property, without regard to the owner's diligence or lack thereof in ferreting out that information. Our holding, limited to the prior version of section 338, subdivision (c), expresses no opinion as to whether, in actions brought under the common law or in equity, the plaintiff will be time barred by laches or the lack of reasonable diligence in identifying the person in possession of the property.
We also express no opinion as to whether, in cases covered by other statutes permitting the Disposition of stolen, lost, or unclaimed property (see e.g., Civ. Code, § 2080.5 [authorizes police or sheriff's departments to sell lost and unclaimed property by public auction in certain cases when the owner cannot, with reasonable diligence, be found]; Pen. Code, § 246.1, subd. (f), 12028, subd. (f); Veh. Code, § 14607.6, subd. (l), 23198, subd. (g) [authorizes the sale of stolen vehicles or firearms whose owners cannot be reasonably identified]), the owner has any recourse under section 338, subdivision (c) against the purchaser of the property. We further note that while this case involves the sale of stolen coins, the sale was conducted by a private party, the alleged thief, and not by a coin dealer governed by Business and Professions Code section 21626 et seq. Those sections, among other things, require coin dealers to file daily reports, after receipt or purchase of coins, with the chief of police or sheriff, and to hold the coins for 30 days before disposing of them. We express no opinion as to whether the owner has any recourse under section 338, subdivision (c) against one who buys stolen coins from a coin dealer following the 30-day waiting period of Business and Professions Code section 21636.
With these limitations in mind, we recognize that our holding, which applies a discov
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