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Grulke v. Erickson12/7/1995
In this personal injury action, plaintiffs, John D. Grulke (Grulke) and Vickie L. Grulke, appeal from the summary judgment dismissing their complaint against defendant, Larry W. Erickson, on the ground that the claims were time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse and remand with directions.
Defendant, a Colorado resident, intended to buy an antique automobile in California. He traveled with Grulke, also a Colorado resident, from Colorado to California to pick up the car in a borrowed pickup truck.
In California, defendant rented a trailer to transport the antique car back to Colorado using the borrowed pickup truck. Grulke was injured when the car rolled out of the trailer and struck him. Plaintiffs' complaint, filed almost three years after the injury, alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to secure the car properly to the trailer and in failing to put the car in a proper gear or engage the parking brake to restrict its movement.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under Colo. Sess. Laws 1986, ch. 114, § 13-80-102(1)(a) at 696, for general tort actions, or under § 13-80-110, C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A) (the borrowing limitations statute), which provides that if a claim arises in another state, and is time-barred by the laws of that state, the claim cannot be maintained in Colorado. It is undisputed that under California law, plaintiffs' claims would be barred under that state's one-year statute of limitations for negligence claims.
In response, plaintiffs argued that the three-year statute of limitations for claims under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, § 10-4-701, et seq., C.R.S. (1994 Repl. Vol. 4A) (the No-Fault Act), found in § 13-80-101(1)(j), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A) (the no-fault limitations statute) applied.
The trial court granted defendant's motion, ruling that, because both the accident and the injuries occurred in California, the claims were time-barred under the borrowing limitations statute by virtue of their being time-barred in that state. The trial court did not address the applicability of the no-fault limitations statute.
On appeal, plaintiffs concede that, if the No-Fault Act is inapplicable, their claims are time-barred under either the borrowing limitations statute or Colorado's general two-year tort limitations period under § 13-80-102(1)(a). They contend, however, that the no-fault limitations statute applies to their claims. Thus, they argue, the trial court erred in ruling that the borrowing limitations statute -- which requires application of the California one-year limitation statute -- governed their claims. We agree with plaintiffs.
On the limited record here, and as the issues have been framed by the parties, we need address only two questions: (1) is the No-Fault Act inapplicable as a matter of law; and, (2) if it is not, does the three-year no-fault statute of limitations or the borrowing statute apply to plaintiffs' claims. We conclude that, based on this record, the answer to the first question is no. Accordingly, as the case is presently postured and on the assumption that plaintiffs can prove a claim arising under the No-Fault Act, the three-year statute of limitations applies. Therefore, the entry of summary judgment based on the one-year California statute of limitations was error. See C.R.C.P. 56(c); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987) (the burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fac
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