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WILLEY v. RILEY12/20/1995
Iowa App. 1993) ("It is well settled that Iowa Code sections 633.197, 633.198, and 633.200 expressly require court approval for compensation of executors and attorneys.").
We agree with the district court that plaintiff's conversion claim fails as a matter of law because Willey, an associate of the defendant law firm, had no right to any attorney fees from the check until the probate court authorized the estate to pay the law firm its one-third contingency fee. A conversion claim cannot lie on behalf of a party who has no right to control the chattel which the party claims was converted. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ยง 222A. After probate court authorization, Willey could be paid by the law firm pursuant to their 1987 fee arrangement. The parties do not dispute the fact that Riley's endorsement of the settlement draft and handling of the instrument by the bank occurred prior to the probate court's authorization of attorney fees to be paid from the Harder estate to the law firm. In any event, the check was the property of the firm and not Willey.
Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on the conversion cross-appeal issue.
IV. Disposition. On the appeal issue, we reverse the portion of the district court's judgment overruling defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the intentional interference with a prospective contract claim concerning Philip Morris. Finding no reversible error on the conversion issue, however, we affirm the cross-appeal. The case is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are taxed to plaintiff Willey.
REVERSED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL; REMANDED. [541 NW2d Page 532]
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