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WILLEY v. RILEY12/20/1995
the law firm issued a check to the Harders for $424,341.58 after deduction of expenses owed by the Harders to the defendant law firm.
The law firm was left with its prospective one-third contingency fee, or $216,666, in its trust account. Of this amount, Riley transferred $166,666 into a ten day, renewable certificate of deposit, also earning 7 1/2% interest, in the law firm's name. Riley transferred the remaining $50,000 into the law firm's general account. All of the transactions initiated by Riley concerning the settlement proceeds occurred prior to February 28, the date the district court authorized the fees and expenses of the law firm arising from its litigation in the wrongful death action to be paid by the administrator of Jamie Harder's estate.
Pursuant to Willey's employment contract with the law firm, the law firm paid him $54,192.19 as a bonus for his work on the Harder case.
In March 1991, based on Riley's handling of the settlement check, Willey amended his earlier petition and claimed the defendants wrongfully converted the settlement check [541 NW2d Page 530]
by endorsing Willey's name and depositing the check in the law firm's trust account.
In January 1993, pursuant to defendants' motion, the district court dismissed Willey's conversion claim in a summary judgment order. Defendants successfully contended that neither Riley nor the law firm were liable to Willey for conversion because there was no wrongful control or dominion over the Harder settlement draft on behalf of the defendants as far as Willey was concerned.
Plaintiff cross-appealed the court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on his conversion claim.
B. Whether a genuine issue of material fact existed as to plaintiffs conversion claim. On cross-appeal, plaintiff Willey contends the district court erred in sustaining defendants' motion for summary judgment concerning plaintiff's claim for conversion in defendants' handling of the $650,000 check settling the Jamie Harder estate wrongful death claim.
1. Summary judgment standards. A defendant may move for summary judgment as to all of the claims asserted against the party under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 237(b). Millington v. Kuba, 532 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Iowa 1995); Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 1994). The movant has the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c); Millington, 532 N.W.2d at 792. When the movant has met this burden, we will uphold a district court's grant of summary judgment. Millington, 532 N.W.2d at 792.
When ascertaining whether the district court correctly concluded the movant has met its burden, we examine whether, upon the basis of such material before the court as would be competent proof at trial, the court would have been compelled to direct a verdict for the movant. Id. If a directed verdict, see Iowa R. Civ. P. 216, would have ultimately been required, then summary judgment is proper, and we will uphold the judgment sustaining the movant's motion. Millington, 532 N.W.2d at 792.
The record, for purposes of this summary judgment cross-appeal issue, consists only of the pleadings, motion for summary judgment and resistance, depositions, affidavits, exhibits, and answers to written interrogatories. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c).
2. No genuine issue of material fact. On cross-appeal, plaintiff asks that we reverse the district court's order sustaining defendants' motion for summary judgment on the conversion issue, and remand the case to the district court for trial on Willey's claim of con
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