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SHELTRA v. ROCHEFORT12/5/1995
erence to Rosemarie Sheltra's failure to use a seat belt was improper pursuant to the statute extant at the time of trial. The Sheltras sought a mistrial. We review a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Joy v. Marston, 581 A.2d 418, 419 (Me. 1990) (citing Olsen v. French, 456 A.2d 869, 876 (Me. 1983)). A trial court's discretion to grant a motion for a mistrial is limited to those rare cases where "no remedy short of a new trial will satisfy the interests of justice." State v. Mason, 528 A.2d 1259, 1260 (Me. 1987).
Here the court instructed the jury to ignore Rochefort's improper reference to seat belts. Absent a showing to the contrary, we assume the jury follows the court's instruction. State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 908, 912 (Me. 1995). A curative jury instruction being proper, Rochefort's mistake was remediable by such instruction. The trial court did not err in denying the Sheltras' motion for a mistrial and curing Rochefort's error instead with an immediate instruction to the jury to ignore the violative reference.
The Sheltras argue in addition, however, that the judgment for Rochefort must be vacated because the trial court erred in limiting examination of her as to her following distance. The opinions and inferences of lay witnesses in testimony are limited to opinions and inferences rationally based on the witness's perception and helpful to a clear understanding of testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue. M.R.Evid. 701. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference is not objectionable merely because it involves an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. M.R.Evid. 704. However, it is well established that a witness may not be permitted to express an opinion that in effect would be dispositive of the issues of law in the case. See Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 704.1 (3d ed. 1994). When a witness is permitted to give an opinion effectively dispositive of an issue assigned to the jury, that opinion does not help the jury but displaces it. We review de novo as a matter of law whether a witness's opinion or inference will help the jury pursuant to M.R.Evid. 701.
Here the Sheltras' counsel, by asking Rochefort if she thought she was traveling at a safe following distance, asked Rochefort in effect if she had complied with 29 M.R.S.A. § 1032 (1978). It was not necessary to the jury's understanding to require of Rochefort this "shorthand" conclusion. Rochefort's conclusion as to the safety of her following distance could not help the jury understand her testimony or determine the fact of negligence. Rochefort's testimony, rather, would do the jury's work for it. The court did not err in refusing to allow Rochefort to answer when she was asked if she thought she followed Rosemarie Sheltra at a "safe" distance. No error exists by which we may disturb the reinstated jury verdict.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded with instructions to enter a
judgment in favor of Victoria Rochefort.
All concurring.
Page 1 2 Maine Personal Injury Attorneys
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