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Ulrigg v. Jones12/5/1995
52 St.Rep. 1198
Submitted on Briefs October 26, 1995.
The Plaintiff, Jodie Ulrigg (Jodie), appeals from the February 6, 1995 opinion and order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, granting Defendant Jack Jones' (Jack) motion for summary judgment. Jack cross-appeals from that part of the June 9, 1995 opinion and order of the District Court granting Jodie's motion to add Safeco Insurance Co. (Safeco) as a party defendant to her lawsuit. We affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jack; we reverse the District Court's order joining Safeco as a party to the lawsuit.
BACKGROUND
On August 18, 1994, Jodie filed her complaint in District Court naming Jack as the sole defendant in her personal injury suit. Jodie alleged that Jack is "the owner of an automobile which negligently struck an automobile driven by [Jodie] on or about September 10, 1991" and that Jack's automobile "was driven by a person whom [Jodie] believes to be [Jack's] daughter, as agent for [Jack] and with the knowledge and permission of [Jack]; that [Jack] was negligent for entrusting his vehicle to his daughter to drive."
Jack answered, admitting that the automobile which he owned was involved in the subject collision on the date alleged and that his daughter Jacque Jones (Jacque) was driving the car at the time of the accident with his permission. Jack denied that Jacque was his agent or that he was negligent for permitting her to use his car.
Subsequently, Jack moved for summary judgment, supporting his motion and brief with the fruits of discovery and with his and Jacque's affidavits. Jodie filed opposing briefs. Following the District Court's February 6, 1995 decision granting Jack summary judgment, Jodie moved to alter or amend the summary judgment and to add Safeco as a party defendant. Jack objected, and on June 9, 1995, the District Court entered its opinion and order refusing to alter or amend its decision on summary judgment, but granting Jodie's motion to add Safeco. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. Other pertinent facts are set forth, as necessary, in our discussion.
We address the following issues on appeal:
I. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Jack?
II. Did the District Court err in granting Jodie's motion to join Safeco as a party defendant in her lawsuit?
DISCUSSION
I.
Notwithstanding that Jodie's notice of appeal only states that she is appealing from the District Court's February 6, 1995 order granting Jack summary judgment, it is apparent from the briefs that both parties presume that Jodie's appeal also includes the District Court's June 9, 1995 denial of her motion to alter or amend the summary judgment order and her renewal of that motion. We will, likewise, proceed on that basis.
Our review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo; we utilize the same criteria as the district court. Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Brown v. Demaree (Mont. 1995), [272 Mont. 479], 901 P.2d 567, 569 (citing Minnie v. City of Roundup (1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214). We look to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and affidavits to determine the existence or nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Krebs v. Ryan Oldsmobile (1992), 255 Mont. 291, 294, 843 P.2d 312, 314 (citing Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. (1991), 249 Mont. 282,
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