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In re Drakulich12/19/1995
rney had paid a percentage portion of the attorney's fees to an investigator in exchange for the investigator's services This court took the extraordinary step in that case of publishing an anonymous private reprimand because the state bar had specifically agreed that "hit is reported that similar fee arrangements are utilized by other local practitioners . . . ." Further, the state bar had represented to this court that publication would "inform other lawyers who are sharing fees with non-lawyers that this conduct is prohibited . . . ." Imposition of a 90-day suspension under the instant questionable circumstances occurring in 1988 would be wholly inconsistent with the far less harsh anonymous discipline issued by this court subsequently in August 1992. It would also be abhorrent to this court's desire to encourage consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. Finally, we are not persuaded that the evidence in this record clearly and convincingly establishes a violation of SCR 203(1). That rule provides. "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." We perceive no clear and convincing evidence supporting the panel's finding that appellant violated any of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct or that he knowingly assisted or induced another to do so.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that dear and convincing evidence does not support the disciplinary panel's findings of misconduct.
[111 Nev. 1556, Page 1572]
Accordingly, we disapprove and reject the panel's recommendations. Further, we vacate our prior order of August 7, 1990, directing the maintenance of confidentiality in this matter. 6 We are of the view, however, that clear and convincing evidence in this record establishes that appellant failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that Hall's conduct was compatible with appellant's professional obligations. See SCR 187(2). This entire proceeding might have been avoided if appellant had simply made reasonable efforts to keep records and documentation specifying the exact nature of Hall's services and the compensation he received. Moreover, appellant should have explained to Hall that appellant could not pay Hall for his services in amounts to be established by a predetermined percentage of appellant's fees. Consequently, we conclude that pursuant to SCR 120(1), appellant shall be assessed all costs of the disciplinary proceeding, including, but not limited to, reporter's fees, investigation fees, bar counsel and staff's salaries, and witness expenses allocable to this proceeding.
Steffen, C. J., and Young, J., concur.
Rose, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority because I find that clear and convincing evidence exists to support the panel's findings that on several occasions Drakulich violated a number of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct by splitting his attorney's fees with Hall. Hall was employed by the Reno Orthopedic Clinic as a bill collector and had continual access to individuals injured in accidents. In reviewing this case de novo, the majority has chosen to accept Drakulich's explanation of why and how payments were made to Hall. I, however, do not. Accordingly, I would support the panel's recommendation to impose a ninety day suspension on Drakulich. The majority concludes that clear and convincing evidence did not exist to support the finding of the board and chooses to reject the panel's finding. Drakulich contends, and the majority apparently agrees, that his testimony was "completely uncontradicted." I disagre
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