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Anderson v. M-Odeco12/7/1995
Richard Anderson appeals a summary judgement in favor of Diamond M-Odeco, Inc. (Odeco). Anderson brings four points of error arguing the action is not barred by the Texas two-year statute of limitations. We reverse and remand.
Anderson, a citizen of the United Kingdom, was injured while on board the M/V Ocean Alliance when a "crown clearance indicator" fell and struck him. Two years and twenty days after the incident, Anderson filed suit against Odeco, Varco International, Inc. (Varco), and other defendants asserting general maritime torts under state and federal laws. Varco moved for summary judgement contending Anderson's claims were barred by Texas' two-year statute of limitations. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. Section(s) 16.003 (Vernon 1986). The trial court granted the motion and severed the action. Anderson appealed and the First Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgement holding that the three-year federal uniform statute of limitations for maritime torts applied. See Anderson v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 905 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.). After the summary judgement in favor of Varco was severed, Odeco filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. Anderson brings this appeal. Anderson contends that Odeco's motion for summary judgement was identical to Varco's motion which was reversed by the First Court. He urges that we should similarly reverse the summary judgment. Odeco, on the other hand, contends that, unlike Varco, its motion for summary judgement was not based entirely on the Texas two-year statute of limitations. Rather, it contends that Anderson's action is barred by subsection (b) of the Jones Act because Anderson is a foreigner who was injured in foreign territorial waters. See 46 U.S.C.A. Section(s) 688(b) (West Supp. 1995).
Initially, we note that we agree with the First Court that the federal uniform statute of limitations for maritime torts applies to this action rather than the Texas two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Congress enacted section 763a, the uniform statute of limitations for maritime torts, in order to provide harmony and uniformity in maritime law. Usher v. M/V Ocean Wave, 27 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1994). Maritime torts are the "type of action which the Constitution has placed under national power to control in its substantive as well as its procedural features." Butler v. American Trawler Co., 887 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953)) (emphasis in Butler). The question, however, is not whether a statute of limitations is "procedural," but rather whether applying the statute would interfere with the uniformity of federal admiralty jurisdiction. Butler, 877 F.2d at 21-22; see also Exxon Corp. v. Choo, 881 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1994); Texaco Ref. and Mktg., Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 (1991); Konrad v. South Carolina Elec. and Gas Co., 417 S.E.2d 557 (S.C. 1992). The result is a "reverse-Erie doctrine" where both state and federal courts apply the federal statute of limitations in maritime cases. Mink v. Genmar Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we agree with the First Court and hold that the three-year federal statute of limitations applies.
Odeco, however, contends that its motion for summary judgment was not based on statute of limitations, but subsection (b) of the Jones Act. Section 688(b) provides that a non-resident alien may not maintain a personal injury action under the Jones Act "or under any other maritime law of the United States" if he has a remedy in his home or host nation and was injured: (1) whil
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