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FRIDERES v. SCHILTZ11/22/1995
ffective date of this section. Under Iowa Code section 3.7(1), this statute therefore took effect on the first day of July following its passage or July 1, 1990. Linda filed this action on September 5, 1991. The defendants argue that application of section 614.8A to the circumstances of this case would amount to an improper retroactive application of the statute. They assert that since Linda's suit would have been barred under the statute of limitations which existed at the time of the events giving rise to her cause of action, the new statute cannot revive her potential claim. The defendants also contend that the legislature only intended the section to apply to causes of action which have arisen since July 1, 1990.
The plaintiffs counter the defendants' assertions by contending that under Iowa law, procedural statutes apply retroactively unless the legislature expressly indicates a contrary intent. The plaintiffs argue that because section 614.8A is a procedural statute and does not impair any substantive rights of the defendants, it applies retroactively.
B. Our legislature has provided a statutory general rule that determines the applicability of its laws. Iowa Code section 4.5 (1993) provides, "A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective." The preference of the legislature for prospectivity is further stated in Iowa Code section 3.7(6) (1993): "Unless retroactive effectiveness is specifically provided for in an Act or resolution, an Act or resolution which is enacted after an effective date provided in the Act or resolution shall take effect upon the date of enactment."
A law is retroactive if it affects acts or facts which occurred, or rights which accrued, before the law came into force. Black's Law Dictionary 1184 (5th ed. 1979); see also Smith v. Korf, 302 N.W.2d 137, 138 (Iowa 1981); Walker State Bank v. Chipokas, 228 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Iowa 1975). We presume that all statutes the legislature enacts are to apply prospectively; that is, they are to apply only to actions which arise after the effective date of the statute, unless the legislature expressly indicates they are to apply retroactively. First Nat'l Bank v. Diers, 430 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 1988); City of Waverly v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 383 N.W.2d 513, 514 (Iowa 1986); Bascom v. District Court, 231 Iowa 360, 362, 1 N.W.2d 220, 221 (1941); see also Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 522 A.2d 1344, 1345 (1987); State Farm v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 219 A.2d 820, 824 (1966); Thompson v. Merritt, 192 Mich. App. 412, [540 NW2d Page 265]
481 N.W.2d 735, 738 (1991); State v. Dimmler, 456 N.W.2d 297, 298 (N.D. 1990). In applying the statutory directive of section 4.5 to determine whether a statute shall apply solely prospectively or retrospectively, we also look to the intent of the legislature. Diers, 430 N.W.2d at 414; City of Waverly, 383 N.W.2d at 514; Walker State Bank, 228 N.W.2d at 51; see also Mason, 522 A.2d at 1345.
C. We have had occasion through the years to consider whether a statute has retrospective effect.
In Secrest v. Galloway Co., 239 Iowa 168, 172, 30 N.W.2d 793, 796 (1948), a statute limiting the time for review of a worker's compensation award was deemed a statute of limitations and was held not to be retroactive. We said, "The rule, apparently, of almost universal application, is, however, that a statute of limitations will be given retroactive effect only when it appears by express provision or necessary implication that such was the legislative intent." Id.
Schulte v. Wageman, relied on by plaintiffs, does not involve a question of retroactivity as in the present case. Schulte v. Wageman, 465 N.W.2d 285, 2
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