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FRIDERES v. SCHILTZ11/22/1995
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Thus, in answer to certified question number four, section 614.8A applies to claims arising from an act of sexual abuse. Therefore, it applies to any of Linda Frideres' theories of liability recognized in law to the extent she seeks recovery for injuries resulting from sexual abuse.
V. Vagueness
The defendants argue section 614.8A is unconstitutionally void for vagueness because it does not place a defendant on notice that it includes claims other than a direct claim of sexual abuse. This argument is without merit. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a noncriminal statute is unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause only when its terms fail to convey sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct as measured by common understanding. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158-64, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1646-47, 40 L.Ed.2d 15, 35-39 (1974); see also Hearst v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 461 N.W.2d 295, 307 (Iowa 1990). If an ordinary person exercising [540 NW2d Page 269]
common sense can sufficiently understand its prohibitions, such a statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 837 (1973). When this court has been confronted with vagueness challenges, we have explained that a statute meets the constitutional requirements if its meaning is "fairly ascertainable by reference to similar statutes, other judicial determinations, and to the dictionary." Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 307; see also Iron Workers v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 772 (Iowa 1971). We have also stated that even in cases where more specific language could be devised, "in the absence of criminal sanctions a statute requires less literal exactitude to comport with due process," and will be upheld unless it "clearly, palpably, and without doubt infringes the constitution." Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 307; see also Lee Enter., Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 162 N.W.2d 730, 739 (Iowa 1968).
An ordinary person of common sense can read the plain language of section 614.8A and determine it encompasses any actions asserting damages resulting from sexual abuse. It does not include claims for damages not having a causal connection to sexual abuse. Because a reasonable person would not be forced to guess as to its scope, the statute is not void for vagueness and therefore the answer to certified question five is "No."
VI. Discovery Rule
In Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 461-62, 150 N.W.2d 94, 99-100 (1967), we adopted a common law discovery rule. We said a cause of action based on negligent design of a house by an architect did not accrue until the plaintiff discovered he had suffered injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it. Id. at 463, 150 N.W.2d at 100.
In Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Iowa 1990), we applied the discovery rule against the State of Iowa in a claim for damages under Iowa Code chapter 25A. We noted the legislature's passage of section 614.8A which states a statutory discovery rule. Id. at 273. Citing this as evidence of a strong public policy, we held that a claim against the state under chapter 25A does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known both the fact of the injury and its cause. See also Wilber v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 476 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1991) (applying discovery rule to latent discovery of mesothelioma by worker).
We adopted the discovery rule again in answering certified questions from the federal court in Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d at 363-64. The claim in Doe as well as in Callahan was for damages for sexual abuse suffered by th
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