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FRIDERES v. SCHILTZ11/22/1995
e plaintiff. Id. at 363; Callahan, 464 N.W.2d at 272.
The common law discovery rule requires that the plaintiff know or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known both the fact of the injury and its cause. Consequently, a person who has always remembered some specific act or acts of sexual abuse may rely on the discovery rule in those instances where the nexus between those specific acts and the claimed injuries is not discovered until a time less than two years prior to commencement of the action. See Doe, 518 N.W.2d at 364.
VII. Negligent Failure to Protect
In Jahnke v. City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d 780, 788 (Iowa 1971), we affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit against the city that claimed liability based on a theory that the city negligently failed to protect the plaintiff from the riotous conduct of an unlawful assemblage of citizens. We held the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 788.
Our court of appeals considered and rejected a claim against a professional referee based on a theory that the officiating was below the accepted standard of competence. Bain v. Gillispie, 357 N.W.2d 47, 49-50 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984). The court found that an independent tort of referee malpractice was not recognized and did not exist. Id. at 49.
In Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255, 256 (Iowa 1983), we discussed the liability of a parent for injuries sustained by a child [540 NW2d Page 270]
caused by the parent in negligently supervising the child. The lawsuit was framed as one of ordinary negligence. Id. at 256.
In answer to certified question number seven, Iowa does not recognize a distinct cause of action denominated "failure to protect" separate and apart from a negligence cause of action. However, allegations of parental failures to protect their children from sexual abuse may be asserted based on ordinary tort principles. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 1078 (1925); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1981); Stubbs v. Hammond, 257 Iowa 1071, 1075, 135 N.W.2d 540, 543 (1965).
VIII. Parental Immunity
With respect to certified question eight we have addressed the issue of parental immunity in Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983). We there held that a parent is immune from liability for alleged negligent acts emanating from the parent-child relationship if the act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; or parental discretion in respect to the provision of food, clothing, shelter, education, medical and dental services, and other care. Id. at 256. Clearly, there is no parental immunity from a negligence claim of a child when the parent knows of and allows sexual abuse of the child.
IX. Premises Liability
Regarding certified question nine, we find the principles regarding parental immunity set out in Wagner apply to parental actions whether they occur on the premises controlled by the parents of a child or elsewhere. See id.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
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