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WOODROFFE v. HASENCLEVER11/22/1995
th through procedural mechanisms including protracted continuation of trial. In Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 227 (D.C.Cir. 1977), the court applied this doctrine when the plaintiff had not suffered all of the injury to which he would ultimately fall prey, stating "the fact of injury was sufficiently plain for plaintiff's cause of action to accrue even though the extent and precise nature of the injury had not yet developed."
Our court has embraced the concept of inquiry notice in several cases spanning a number of years. In Estate of Montag v. T.H. Agriculture & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa 1993), we approved of this doctrine:
Under our cases the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff first becomes aware of facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to begin seeking information as to the problem and its cause. In that case, "the period of limitations is the outer time limit for making the investigation and bringing the action. The period begins at the time the person is on inquiry notice."
Id. (quoting Franzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985)).
In the Franzen case, we said the following: Moreover, the duty to investigate does not depend on exact knowledge of the nature of the problem that caused the injury . It is sufficient that the person be aware that [540 NW2d Page 49]
a problem existed. One purpose of inquiry is to ascertain its exact nature.
Plaintiffs knew the instrumentality that caused the injury at the time it occurred. They knew the injury was caused when Eligius became entangled in the beaters of the forage wagon. The information they possessed on the date of the accident was plainly sufficient to put them on inquiry notice concerning possible defects in the wagon. They did not investigate at that time. When they later investigated, they found the alleged defects they now rely on. They are not aided by the fact they postponed their investigation until their discussion with a lawyer in January 1981. The lawyer's suggestion that they might have an actionable claim did not diminish their prior duty to investigate the facts when they were on inquiry notice.
Franzen, 377 N.W.2d at 662-63. See also Nachazel v. Mira Co. Mfg., 466 N.W.2d 248, 252-53 (Iowa 1991) (plaintiffs and their attorneys possessed imputed knowledge that Mira's assets were held by Ahrens Company, this knowledge being sufficient to place plaintiffs on inquiry notice).
We considered the breadth of application of the discovery rule in Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc., 408 N.W.2d 347, 350-52 (Iowa 1987). Quoting with approval from Chrischilles v. Griswold, we said the relevant question is this:
The question in any given case is not, What did plaintiff know of the injury done him? but, What might he have known, by the use of the means of information within his reach, with the vigilance which the law requires of him?
Sparks, 408 N.W.2d at 351 (quoting Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 462, 150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967)).
In Sparks we explained the rule as follows:
The statute begins to run when the person gains knowledge sufficient to put him on inquiry. On that date, he is charged with knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation. Moreover, once a person is aware a problem exists, he has a duty to investigate even though he may not have exact knowledge of the nature of the problem that caused the injury .
Sparks, 408 N.W.2d at 351 (citations omitted).
The question in Sparks was whether the statute of limitations bar of plaintiff's action based on negli
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