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Jones v. Wilkin11/1/1995
ot clearly intend to grant immunity for disclosures under those circumstances.
[111 Nev. 1335, Page 1338]
Turning next to the district court's finding that the claims should have been submitted to the Screening Panel, to the extent that Jones alleges intentional torts, this is not a medical malpractice case, because Jones does not accuse the respondents of failing to use reasonable care, skill or knowledge when they diagnosed and treated her back pain 5; rather, Jones alleges that respondents reported falsely that she obtained prescription medicines in violation of NRS 453.391. Respondents were not "render services" within the contemplation of NRS 41A.009 when they signed affidavits that led NDOI to prosecute Jones. Jones' tort action cannot be characterized as a medical malpractice suit simply because the underlying acts are tangentially connected to doctor-patient and hospital-patient relationships. Obviously, every tortious act that a health care professional commits cannot be described as medical malpractice. Jones' intentional tort claims do not constitute a malpractice action and are not covered by NRS 41A.016. Jones' allegations of negligent maintenance of medical records are properly characterized as medical malpractice. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal without prejudice of those claims. We hold that NRS 41A.016 does not preclude Jones from bringing an action in district court alleging intentional torts. We vacate the order of the district court as to the intentional tort claims and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Opinion Footnotes}
1 NRS 41A.016 states, in pertinent part: "(1) No cause of action involving medical malpractice may be filed until the medical malpractice case has been submitted to an appropriate screening panel and a determination made by such panel as provided in NRS 41A.003 to 41A.069."
2 NRS 453.391 states that: "A person shall not: . . . . 2. While undergoing treatment and being supplied with any controlled substance or a prescription for any controlled substance from one practitioner, knowingly obtain any controlled substance or a prescription for a controlled substance from another practitioner without disclosing this fact to the second practitioner."
3 Jones alleges that the State dismissed the criminal charges because the respondents refused to testify at trial. The respondents deny this allegation. The record does not reveal why the State decided not to prosecute Jones for violating NRS 453.391.
4 NRS 629.061(4) provides: "A provider of health care or owner or operator of an ambulance, his agents and employees are immune from any civil action for any disclosures made in accordance with the provisions of this section or any consequential damages." A careful reading of NRS 629.061 shows that it provides immunity to health care professions for civil actions when they make disclosures of a patient's health care records to certain agencies for specific investigations, including: (1) the attorney general for welfare fraud and industrial insurance fraud; and (2) state licensing board investigators for their respective background checks.
5 NRS 41A.009 defines medical malpractice as "the failure of a physician, hospital or employee of a hospital, in rendering services, to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances."
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