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Allstate Insurance Co. v. Smith9/25/1995
EN BANC
We granted certiorari in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Smith, 879 P.2d 458 (Colo. App. 1994), to decide whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that mileage costs for transportation to and from health care providers for the treatment of injuries arising from an automobile accident are compensable under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act (Act). Because we conclude that such transportation expenses are "reasonable and necessary expenses" for medical services, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and return this case to that court for remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
I
There is no dispute among the parties as to the facts. On May 5, 1991, respondent Melanie Smith was injured in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Smith was insured by petitioner Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) under a complying no-fault policy. Smith submitted a claim for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to Allstate, which included a request for reimbursement of travel expenses to and from her health care provider. Allstate paid those expenses required under section 10-4-706(1)(b), 4A C.R.S. (1994). However, Allstate refused to pay for Smith's travel expenses. Allstate then filed this action for declaratory judgment to determine whether it has an obligation to pay medical transportation expenses under the Act.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Allstate, holding that transportation expenses are "subsistence costs" not covered by section 10-4-706(1)(b). The court of appeals reversed, holding that mileage costs for transportation to and from health care providers for the treatment of injuries arising from an automobile accident are reasonable and necessary expenses for medical and nonmedical remedial care treatment and are compensable under the Act. Allstate, 879 P.2d at 459. The court of appeals found that "transportation costs are directly related to obtaining necessary medical care" and "travel to and from health care providers is an essential element of medical treatment." Id. We agree.
II
In construing statutory provisions we should give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542, 545 (Colo. 1995) (citing Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120, 123-24 (Colo. 1992)). We must "first look to the statutory language itself, giving words and phrases their commonly accepted and understood meaning." Id. at 545. Where the language of a statute is plain and the meaning is clear, we need not resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction, but must apply the statute as written. Id.; Martin v. Montezuma - Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237, 246 (Colo. 1992). Words and phrases utilized in a statute should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning because we presume the General Assembly meant what it said. PDM Molding, 898 P.2d at 545 (citing Griffin v. S.W. Devaney & Co., Inc., 775 P.2d 555, 559 (Colo. 1989)); see also Engelbrecht v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 680 P.2d 231, 233 (Colo. 1984). Our inquiry is best informed, therefore, by resort to the plain language of the Act.
III
A
The Act governs compensation without regard to fault for injuries arising from an automobile accident. The Act's legislative declaration provides:
The general assembly declares that its purpose in enacting this part 7 is to avoid inadequate compensati
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