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SLAYMAKER v. ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO.9/22/1995
Robert and Bruce Slaymaker and Steven Huggins appeal the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Archer-Daniels-Midland Company and Abell-Howe Company. We affirm.
In 1993 Robert and Bruce Slaymaker brought suit against their employer, Abell-Howe Company (Abell-Howe) and the owner of a building that was being demolished by Abell-Howe, Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM). Plaintiffs alleged that while performing demolition work in 1991 they were exposed to asbestos at the demolition site through inhalation, skin contact, and other exposure. In December of 1993, Steven Huggins joined the suit against ADM alone, alleging asbestos exposure while working as a carpenter at the site in 1993. As a result of their alleged exposure, plaintiffs sought personal injury damages under theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Slaymakers were both examined at the University of Iowa Hospital in Iowa City in 1992 to determine what, if any, damage had been caused by the asbestos exposure. The results of their examinations showed that neither Robert nor Bruce had suffered any significant damage to their lungs due to asbestos exposure. Based on these examinations it was impossible to determine whether Bruce or Robert would suffer any adverse health consequences from their claimed exposure to asbestos. Huggins never underwent any kind of examination in regard to his claimed exposure.
In May of 1994 Abell-Howe filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the Slaymakers' claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of Iowa workers' compensation law, Iowa Code section 85.20 (1993). This provision limits recovery for work-related injury to workers' compensation benefits. ADM also sought summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs could not prove any physical harm resulting from the asbestos exposure and that any mental distress suffered by plaintiffs was, at best, minimal.
The district court granted both motions. On the negligence claim against ADM, the court found that plaintiffs suffered neither physical injury nor severe emotional harm. The court further found that plaintiffs failed to show an increased statistical likelihood of [540 NW2d Page 461]
such injury developing in the future. Finally, the court determined that plaintiffs had failed to meet the outrageousness element necessary to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In granting Abell-Howe's motion, the court found that the Slaymakers' injury claims were cognizable under Iowa's workers' compensation law and were thus barred by section 85.20's exclusivity provision.
On a motion for summary judgment our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 4. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c); see Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milne, 424 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Iowa 1988). The moving party has the burden to show the nonexistence of a material fact, Milne, 424 N.W.2d at 423, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the resisting party. Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Gott, 387 N.W.2d 342, 343 (Iowa 1986). The procedure is functionally akin to a directed verdict, and every legitimate inference that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence should be afforded the resisting party. Id.; Sherwood v. Nissen, 179 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 1970). A fact issue is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resol
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