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SLAYMAKER v. ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO.9/22/1995
ved, but if the conflict in the record consists only of the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts, entry of summary judgment is proper. Milne, 424 N.W.2d at 423; Gott, 387 N.W.2d at 343.
We agree with the district court that plaintiffs have failed to show any compensable injury as a result of their asbestos exposure. Plaintiffs contend that although they have suffered no present physical injury they should be allowed to seek recovery based on their fear of developing cancer in the future. To recover for fear of future injury, plaintiffs must show (1) they are aware they possess an increased statistical likelihood of physical injury and (2) from that knowledge there exists a reasonable apprehension which manifests itself in mental distress. Kosmacek v. Farm Service Co-op of Persia, 485 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Iowa App. 1992). The emotional distress must be so severe that a reasonable man or woman could not be expected to endure it. Id. at 104 (citing Nesler v. Fisher and Co., Inc., 452 N.W.2d 191, 199-200 (Iowa 1990)).
Here, plaintiffs have not met their burden. First they have not shown any statistical likelihood of developing cancer or other disease in the future. Second, they have failed to establish that they have suffered severe emotional distress. Instead, plaintiffs have merely testified to vague fears of developing cancer in the future. Such fears do not create an issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Thus, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs have shown no injury as a matter of law.
In addition to seeking recovery for negligence, plaintiffs claim that ADM's action constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress. To prevail on this theory, plaintiffs must show (1) outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) the defendant's intentional causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) that plaintiffs are suffering severe emotional distress; and (4) actual or proximate cause of the emotional distress by defendant's conduct. Vaughn v. Ag. Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 635-36 (Iowa 1990) (citing Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984)). For conduct to be considered outrageous it must be "`so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Id. (citing Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 801 (Iowa 1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ยง 46 cmt. d (1965)). We agree with the district court that as a matter of law plaintiffs have not met the outrageousness element on the facts alleged in this case.
Finally, we look to plaintiffs' claims against Abell-Howe. Defendant Abell-Howe asserts that plaintiffs' claims against it are barred by Iowa Code section 85.20. This section provides that workers' compensation be the exclusive remedy for an [540 NW2d Page 462]
employee's work-related injury. Plaintiffs contend that section 85.20 does not apply to their claim because, having shown no physical injury, there are no workers' compensation benefits available to them. Injury under Iowa workers' compensation law, however, "is broader than mere reference to some objective physical break or wound to the body, but includes also the consequences therefrom, including mental ailments or nervous conditions." Deaver v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 170 N.W.2d 455, 466 (Iowa 1969). Purely mental injury, then, is not outside the realm of Iowa workers' compensation. Dunlavey v. Economy Fire and Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 846 (Iowa 1995). We agree with the district court that plaintiffs' complaints about physical injury from asbestos exposure and resulting mental an
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