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JOHNSON v. FARMER9/20/1995
aid down in Walker v. Mlakar, 489 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Iowa 1992), may be shown by circumstantial evidence. In the Walker case, we recognized that the requirements of actual knowledge of the peril may be shown by circumstantial evidence but concluded that the circumstantial evidence in that case was not sufficient to show actual knowledge. Id. at 406. We are convinced that plaintiffs' proof in the present case is similarly deficient. The only knowledge that Farmer had of the road conditions came from encountering those conditions as she drove over the highway from Ankeny to Perry. Prior to the accident, she had driven for nearly thirty minutes with no indication that there was any difficulty in controlling the vehicle. The evidence indicated that Farmer was driving at approximately fifty-five miles per hour. Although an officer of the Iowa State Patrol testified that forty miles per hour would have been a more prudent speed for the road conditions that Farmer confronted, that testimony would only permit but not compel a finding of negligence on Farmer's part. It falls considerably short of meeting the test for gross negligence laid down in Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Iowa 1981). There, we indicated that gross negligence contemplates an actual realization of imminent danger, coupled with a reckless disregard or lack of concern for the probable consequences of the act. Id. There is no evidence in the present record, direct or circumstantial, tending to show the requisite realization of danger and reckless lack of concern on Farmer's part. We have previously approved the determination of the gross negligence issues by a motion for summary judgment. See Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 473 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Iowa 1991). We are convinced that the issue was correctly determined by the district court's ruling on the summary judgment motion in the present case.
III. Exclusive Remedy Bar to Loss-of-Consortium Claims.
As a final issue, we must consider the claims of Donna's husband and children that their loss-of-consortium claims are not subject to the exclusive-remedy provisions of section 85.20. We are unable to accept that contention. As the district court noted in its decision dismissing the loss-of-consortium claims, section 85.20 expressly provides that the workers' compensation remedies "shall be the exclusive and only rights and remedies of such employee, the employee's personal or legal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury ." The exclusive remedy provisions of section 85.20 serve to preclude the loss-of-consortium claims as well as Donna's bodily injury claim.
We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
AFFIRMED. [537 NW2d Page 774]
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