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Moore v. Novark9/28/1995
sequent prosecution are not extreme and outrageous conduct. An employer act within his legal rights in investigating reasonably credible allegations of wrongdoing by his employees. Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). As already discussed, Constable Moore merely gathered statements reporting wrongful conduct. He then passed that information on to the prosecuting authorities when they requested it of him, which was his only action connection with Novark's prosecution. There is no evidence beyond surmise or suspicion that Constable Moore acted with malice or in bad faith. Constable Moore exercised his legal right to discharge Novark, an at-will employee. See Casas, 856 S.W.2d at 735 (the fact of discharge alone of an at-will employee cannot give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
We conclude that Constable Moore is not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law. We sustain Constable Moore's fifth point of error complaining of the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding.
Official Immunity
Our decision as to Constable Moore need not rest on the lack of evidence alone. In his tenth point of error, Constable Moore argues that he acted in good faith as a matter of law and is therefore shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. We agree.
Under the doctrine of official immunity, public officials whose actions may be classified as discretionary enjoy immunity from personal liability as long as they act with good faith within the scope of their authority. City of Lancaster&v; Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994); Augustine by Augustine v. Nusom, 671 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Immunity will only be extended to officials performing discretionary duties as opposed to those performing ministerial duties, which require obedience to orders or the performance of duties over which the actor has no choice. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 654; Wyse v. Department of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex. App. -- Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Discretionary actions, sometimes referred to as "quasi-judicial" actions, are actions requiring personal deliberation, decision and judgment. Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 645 (Tex. App. -- San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When a state employee gathers facts and then acts on those facts, his actions are quasi-judicial in nature. Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. App. -- Waco 1986, no writ); Augustine, 671 S.W.2d at 115.
The purpose of the doctrine of official immunity is to protect public officials from civil liability for conduct that would otherwise be actionable. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653-54. The doctrine is based on sound public policy which encourages public officers to perform their duties without fear of personal liability for negligent or improper performance. Chapman v. Gonzales, 824 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). An officer acts in good faith and is entitled to official immunity from liability if a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that his acts were justified. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656; City of Dallas v. Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc., 883 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 1994, no writ).
The issue of official immunity in this case is similar to that in Boozier v. Hambrick, 846 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. App. -- Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). In Boozier, the First Court of Appeals characterized a police officer's action in reporting misconduct to her supervisor as a discretionary act, and thus qua
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