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Copper Mountain Inc. v. Poma of America Inc.2/6/1995
ility, the plaintiff would be at a distinct advantage after releasing the first tortfeasor in that the second tortfeasor would face the possibility of being held liable for the entire judgment despite being found only partially responsible. Under our current system of equitable apportionment of liability, however, the plaintiff and the second tortfeasor remain in the same position regardless of whether the first tortfeasor was released for less than his or her proportionate share of liability. Contrary to the argument put forth by Copper, the second tortfeasor is no more obligated to take the case to trial than he or she was prior to the initial settlement. See Stubbs, 862 P.2d at 984-85.
In light of the intent of the legislature and the important public policy in favor of settlement of disputes, we decline to adopt the "reasonable range" test set forth in Tech-Bilt. Instead, we affirm the court of appeals' Conclusion that for purposes of section 13-50.5-105, a settlement is reached in "good faith" in the absence of collusive conduct. We now consider whether the agreement in this case was collusive.
C
Adopting the definition utilized by the California Supreme Court in River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 505 (1972), the court of appeals explained that a collusive agreement requires more than mere confederacy: "'Any negotiated settlement involves cooperation, but not necessarily collusion. It becomes collusive in this context when it is aimed to injure the interests of an absent tortfeasor.'" Stubbs, 862 P.2d at 984 (quoting River Garden Farms, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505). The court also found that it is the burden of the party challenging the agreement to prove that the agreement was collusive. Id. In addition, the court held a finding of good faith will be reversed only upon a showing that it was clearly erroneous because of lack of evidentiary support or incorrect application of law. Stubbs, 862 P.2d at 986 (citing Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983)).
These legal Conclusions are sound in law and are not disputed by Copper. Copper objects only to the factual findings of the court, claiming that even under the "intent to injure" definition of collusion applied by the court, the agreement here was entered in bad faith. We disagree.
The trial court held that Stubbs disclosed the agreement to Copper prior to the execution of their settlement agreement. It might be argued that regardless of the fact the agreement was eventually disclosed, at the time the parties entered into the agreement they intended that it remain secret and it was therefore entered in bad faith. See ยง 13-50.5-105, 6A C.R.S. (1987 & 1994 Supp.) (stating that the agreement must be "given in good faith" in order to discharge the settlor from liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor) (emphasis added). As determined by the trial court, the facts do not indicate that the parties agreed to keep the settlement a secret. To the contrary, the uncontradicted testimony of Stubbs' counsel was that he "put a condition on agreement that if Copper Mountain should ever ask for it that we would immediately produce it." On cross- examination, Stubbs' counsel explained that it was "nobody's idea that [the agreement] not be disclosed. It was my view that it was incumbent upon the party who wanted it to ask for it." Hence, the record supports the trial court's finding that Stubbs and Poma did not conceal or misrepresent the existence of the settlement agreement. We therefore reject Copper's argument that the instant agreement was und
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