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State v. Minix2/24/1995
R.C. 2151.356. R.C. 2151.356 provides:
"(A) Unless division (C) of this section applies, if a child is found to be a juvenile traffic offender, the court may make any of the following orders of disposition:
"(1) Impose a fine not to exceed fifty dollars and costs;
"(2) Suspend the child's probationary operator's license or the registration of all motor vehicles registered in the name of such child for such period as the court prescribes;
"(3) Revoke the child's probationary driver's license or the registration of all motor vehicles registered in the name of such child;
"(4) Place the child on probation;
"(5) Require the child to make restitution for all damages caused by his traffic violation or any part thereof[.]" (Emphasis added.)
The clear language of R.C. 2151.356 expressly authorizes a juvenile court judge to revoke a child's probationary operator's license. A probationary license is defined as "the license issued to any person between sixteen and eighteen years of age to operate a motor vehicle." R.C. 4507.01(A). It is thus clear that while a juvenile court may suspend or revoke a juvenile traffic offender's probationarsdriver's license, a juvenile court may not suspend a driver's license beyond the offender's eighteenth birthday. R.C. 2151.356; State v. Rice (July 3, 1990), Lucas App. No. L-89-364, unreported, 1990 WL 97687 juvenile court could not revoke driver's license beyond eighteenth birthday for violation of R.C. 4511.19).
The court in this case attempted to revoke appellant's driver's license until he made restitution. While a juvenile court may generally order restitution, the statute does not permit a judge to use a restitution order to suspend a license beyond that time proscribed by the statute. Clearly, a juvenile judge may suspend a driver's license only until the offender's eighteenth birthday, regardless of the status of the restitution order absent application of R.C. 2151.356(A)(7).
As a result, we sustain appellant's first assignment of error and need not reach appellant's second assignment of error. See App.R. 12. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Pursuant to App.R. 12, we enter final judgment that appellant is no longer restricted from making application for his driver's license.
Judgment reversed.
PETER B. ABELE and STEPHENSON, JJ., concur.
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