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Banks v. LTV Steel Co.2/22/1995
HARPER, Judge.
Appellant, Rita Banks, appeals from the summary judgment granted by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in her claim for workers' compensation against appellees, LTV Steel Company (LTV), and the Industrial Commission of Ohio (the "commission"), and the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and enter judgment for appellant.
On April 21, 1986, appellant, an employee of LTV, was struck by a large steel panel and was pinned underneath. She was taken to the hospital for treatment of the injuries she sustained. Appellant's injuries were recognized by the commission for having suffered "chest contusion, cervical and lumber myfascitis, contusion left forearm and contusion left leg."
On April 26, 1988, appellant filed for additional recognition for a post-traumatic stress disorder arising from the injury she suffered on April 21, 1986. The commission referred appellant to a psychiatrist, Dr. Patricia Martin. Dr. Martin, after examining appellant, diagnosed her as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Walter Knake, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who treated appellant in 1992, confirmed Dr. Martin's diagnoses.
The record shows that appellant was first diagnosed for the post-traumatic stress disorder on April 1, 1988 by Dr. David Fero.
The commission allowed appellant's claim for post-traumatic stress disorder. LTV challenged the claim, arguing that post-traumatic stress disorder is not a "flow through" disorder, but one which arises directly and independently from the fear-causing event itself, and therefore, not compensable. LTV, in its motion for summary judgment, also argues that since appellant's injury was a direct consequence of the 1986 injury, it was time-barred.
Appellant assigns the following error for our review:
"It was error for the Trial Court to grant LTV STEEL COMPANY's `Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment' because it constitute a misapplication of the Workers' Compensation Law to disputed facts."
Appellant in her sole assignment of error argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on appellees' contention that her claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant argues that the trial court's interpretation implies that she knew of her condition five days after her injury .
The applicability of R.C. 4123.84 to "flow through" conditions is set forth in the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Clementi v. Wean United, Inc. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 342, 530 N.E.2d 909. The court held that:
"R.C. 4123.84 requires a claimant to file a motion for an additional allowance within two years of the time the claimant knew or should have known of the additional condition." See, also, Edwards v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 119, 537 N.E.2d 1305.
Applying Clementi and Edwards to the instant case we must determine whether appellant knew or should have known of the psychiatric condition more than two years prior to April 26, 1988. We think not. Appellees base their argument on the fact that appellant mentioned in a deposition that she had dreams about the accident shortly after the injury . Even if we go by the deposition testimony, we still do not believe that the record supports appellees' contention that appellant knew more than two years before she filed her complaint. Appellees attempt to support their argument by the following colloquy:
"Q. How often do you think about it?
"A. I be dreaming about it a lot.
"Q. How long has tha
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