 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills Inc.2/2/1995
rity blur the distinction between "compensable injuries" (the scope of the Workers' Compensation Law) and "compensation" (entitlement to benefits). That distinction has been in the statutory scheme from its inception and, until now, the exclusivity
provision has been construed to cover all "compensable injuries," even those that do not result in the payment of "compensation."
This court has established a method of construing statutes, which applies to the provisions in question. Our overriding aim is to discern the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). First, we examine the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. When reading the text of a statute, certain principles apply, including the principle that the text means what this court's prior interpretation thereof states. Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344, 350 n. 6, 838 P.2d 600 (1992). The context of a statute includes its historical development. Krieger v. Just, 319 Or. 328, 336, 876 P.2d 754 (1994). If the meaning of a statute is unclear from the text and context, the court looks to legislative history and then, if the meaning still is unclear, to "general maxims of statutory construction," to determine the legislature's intent. PGE, 317 Or. at 611-12, 859 P.2d 1143.
At present, ORS 656.005(7)(a) defines "compensable injury ." It provides, as relevant here:
"A 'compensable injury ' is an accidental injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means, if it is established by medical evidence, supported by objective findings, subject to the following limitations:
"(A) No injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury unless the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the consequential condition.
"(B) If a compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant condition is compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment."
ORS 656.005(7)(a) supplies a two-step analysis. The first step is to decide whether a worker's injury falls within
the definition--i.e., whether the worker's injury is a "compensable injury." If the workers' injury is a "compensable injury," then the second step is to take into consideration the "limitations" in subparagraphs (A) and (B). Those subparagraphs describe a subclass of "compensable injuries" for which workers will not receive benefits. In effect, subparagraphs (A) and (B) say that, even if a worker has a "compensable injury," the worker must prove that the "compensable injury" should be compensated; the worker must establish that the compensable injury in fact caused the harm complained of. Either the worker has a compensable injury for which the worker can receive benefits, or the worker has a compensable injury for which the worker can receive no benefits. Either way, however, every injury that is "an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment" is a "compensable injury," no matter how subparagraphs (A) and (B) affect the workers' ability to collect benefits.
The foregoing reading of ORS 656.005(7)(a) is based on the plain grammar, structure, and logic of the paragraph. That reading is even clearer when that paragraph is contrasted to ORS 656.005(7)(b). ORS 656.005(7)(b) provides:
<
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Oregon Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|