 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
MURPHY v. RICHLAND MEMORIAL HOSPITAL2/27/1995
Robert S. Murphy (Murphy) argues the trial judge erred in granting Richland Memorial Hospital's (Hospital) summary judgment motion. We affirm.
FACTS
Jamie Cheek was allegedly injured at Hospital on September 20, 1989. Thereafter, Murphy, the representative of her estate, filed a negligence action against Hospital on December 23, 1991 and effected service February 9, 1992 on Hospital.
Hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis the action was barred by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (Torts Claims Act) which provides a two year statute of limitations. The trial judge granted Hospital's motion for summary judgment. Murphy appeals.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Murphy argues the trial judge erred in applying the Tort Claims Act statute of limitations, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110 (Supp. 1993), because this action is for medical malpractice and, therefore, the medical malpractice statute of limitations, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-545 (Supp. 1993), is the proper statute of limitations to be applied in this case. We disagree.
The Tort Claims Act restores the tort immunity of governmental entities except as was waived by the Act itself. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(b) (Supp. 1993). Section 15-78-20(b) states the Act is the "exclusive civil remedy available for any tort committed by a governmental entity, its employees, or its agents except as provided in § 15-78-70(b)." In Benton v. Roger C. Peace Hospital, this Court recently held the "Act clearly states it provides the exclusive remedy for governmental torts . . .." 313 S.C. 520, 522, 443 S.E.2d 537, 538 (1994). Hospital is a governmental entity. Accordingly, the trial judge properly held the Tort Claims Act controls.
Murphy next contends having a two year statute of limitations for victims injured by governmental hospitals while having a three year statute of limitations for victims injured by private hospitals violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the South Carolina Constitution. We disagree.
To satisfy equal protection the classification must (1) bear a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be achieved, (2) members of the class must be treated alike under similar circumstances, and (3) the classification must rest on some rational basis. Hanvey v. Oconee Memorial Hosp., 308 S.C. 1, 416 S.E.2d 623 (1992). Murphy contends there is no rational basis for classifying the victims of torts committed by private hospitals and victims of torts committed by governmental hospitals differently.
In determining whether a statute violates equal protection, this Court accords "great deference to a legislatively created classification, and the classification will be sustained if it is not plainly arbitrary and there is any reasonable hypothesis to support it." Cerny v. Salter, 311 S.C. 430, 429 S.E.2d 809 (1993). The party asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute has the burden of showing the classification is essentially arbitrary and without any reasonable basis. Foster v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 306 S.C. 519, 413 S.E.2d 31 (1992).
Historically, all persons were barred from bringing tort claims against governmental entities. The doctrine of sovereign immunity began to come under fire as being "archaic and outmoded." McKenzie v. City of Florence, 234 S.C. 428, 435, 108 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1959), overruled on other grounds by, McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). The legislature subsequently passed various exceptions to the doctrine. See e.g. S.C. Code Ann §§ 57-5-810 to -860 (1976). We noted, however, the exceptions reflected "a scattered patchwork of sovereign liability that
Page 1 2 South Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|