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Williams v. Maryland9/1/1994
in that position was proper under the circumstances of the case.
Id. at 881.
The Washington State Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in State v. McKinney, 19 Wash. App. 23, 573 P.2d 820 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). There the defendant, McKinney, was convicted of robbery in the first degree while armed with a firearm. Apparently, McKinney and a companion, both of whom were escapees from a prison work release program, robbed a tavern where they had been drinking for several hours. Id. at 820. As his companion pointed a gun at the bartender, McKinney emptied out the cash drawer. McKinney testified at trial that he was "coerced into taking the money from the till and that, had he not cooperated with his companion, either [McKinney] or the bartender might have been shot." Id. at 821. In dismissing the duress defense, the court cited Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.060, which defines the elements of the duress defense. Id. Specifically, the court noted subsection (3), which provides that "the defense of duress is not available
if the actor intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subject to duress." Id. at 821. Finding nothing on the record to suggest that McKinney "acted under any personal constraint or that he was threatened," the court held that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury as to this affirmative defense. Id.
In People v. Rodriquez, 30 Ill. App. 3d 118, 332 N.E.2d 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), the defendant, Rodriquez, was granted a three day furlough from jail and did not return, claiming that he was in fear of retribution from one of the corrections officers. Id. at 196. Apparently, the officer had given Rodriquez money to buy a pound of marijuana while out on furlough, which Rodriquez subsequently spent while celebrating. Id. at 196. The court held that the defense of compulsion, as defined by Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, sec.7-11(a) (1973), was not applicable. Id. at 196. The court further noted that, even assuming the presence of the alleged threat, Rodriquez's assertion of compulsion fails because
if [the compulsion] actually existed, arose only from the defendant's appropriation for his own use of the funds given to him by the prison officer. Had the defendant returned the money instead of squandering it or had he completed the illegal scheme as planned, no compulsion would have arisen. Thus the compulsion resulted from the defendant's own negligence or fault, and the statutory defense is therefore inapplicable.
Id.
A similar result was reached by the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Bailey, 41 Colo. App. 385, 590 P.2d 508 (Colo. Ct. App.
1978). There the defendants were convicted of the sale of narcotics, dispensing dangerous drugs, and conspiracy to sell narcotic drugs. Id. at 509. The defendants claimed that the conduct of undercover CBI (Colorado Bureau of Investigation) agents, who posed as mafia gangsters and talked of eliminating "snitches," constituted duress. Id. at 510. The court, citing Section 18-1-708 of the Colorado code (C.R.S. 1973), held that the facts did not support a finding of duress. The court further noted that, in any case, the duress defense was not available because "defendants intentionally or recklessly placed themselves in a situation in which it was foreseeable that they might be subjected to force or threatened use of force." Id. at 510. See also State v. Kinslow, 165 Ariz. 503, 799 P.2d 844, 848 (Ariz. 1990) (noting that the duress defense was not available to a prison escapee because under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-412(B) the duress defense is unavailable "if the person intentionally, k
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