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Williams v. Maryland9/1/1994
was convicted of bank robbery. On appeal, Merhige stated that the robbers were total strangers and that he was not aware of their intentions to rob a bank. He further asserted that throughout the robbery, he was afraid for his life and that the robbers forced him to acquiesce to their demands. In reversing Merhige's conviction the Supreme Court of Michigan cited the definition of the duress defense found in 16 Corpus Juris at 91:
An act which would otherwise constitute a crime may also be excused on the grounds that it was done under compulsion or duress. The compulsion which will excuse a criminal act, however, must be present, imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. Such compulsion must have arisen without the negligence or fault of the person who insists upon it as a defense.
Id. at 422. (emphasis added). In People v. Kelly, 51 Mich. App. 28, 214 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) the Court of Appeals of Michigan relied on Merhige as the "correct rule." In that case, the defendant, Kelly, was charged with armed
robbery and found guilty by the trial court. Id. at 335. On appeal, Kelly alleged that the trial judge's instructions on the duress defense, taken directly from Merhige, constituted prejudicial error. Id. at 335. Concluding that Merhige "still is good law," the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed. Id. at 335.
In State v. Patterson, 117 Ore. 153, 241 P. 977 (Or. 1925), the defendant was convicted of larceny by embezzlement. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury that no evidence existed to support the defense of duress. The Supreme Court of Oregon, citing 16 C. J. 91, affirmed the defendant's conviction noting that the embezzlement "had its origin in the defendant's own voluntary shortcoming. He himself was the controlling and indispensable factor in the matter. He himself began the digression from the path of rectitude. Without his act, the situation which he claims was compulsory would not have occurred." Id. at 978. See also, State v. Clay, 220 Iowa 1161, 264 N.W. 77, 83 (Iowa 1935); Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82 N.E. 781 ( Ind. 1907).
In addition to the case law mentioned above, we also note that the Model Penal Code § 2.09 defines duress as follows:
(1) It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
(2) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable
that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged.
Model Penal Code § 2.09 (10 U.L.A.) (1974 & Supp. 1994). The Comments to Tentative Draft No. 10 indicate that the drafters recognized that "in the absence of governing legislation, the case law generally recognizes the defense but imposes limitations on its scope similar to those articulated in the statutes." (footnote omitted) ALI, Model Penal Code § 2.09 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960). The drafters then specifically noted that
subsection (2) accepts the view that there should be no exculpation if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situ
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