Williams v. Maryland9/1/1994
Rodney Eubanks. Because of his inability to repay promptly, Williams allegedly was forced to make the first drug run up to New York. He also participated in another drug run. In other words, the evidence does not suggest that he was forced to make these runs, he did this of his own volition to help pay off his debt. By becoming involved with this drug ring, Williams through his own recklessness made others aware of his connection with Eubanks, including his abductors. Williams was readily identifiable to those in the organization, including his abductors, and the abductors acted accordingly. This was a situation that would not have occurred but for Williams's association with the drug organization. Considering these facts and the applicable law, we conclude that Williams's assertion that the defense of duress applies is unavailing.
Attempted Robbery
Appellant next asserts that because the trial court's finding that "Reverend Hale was completely innocent" means that "[Hale's] apartment could not have been the stash house, and that [Williams] must have known this" and further that "[Williams] could not have entered the apartment with the intent to steal drugs and money from the apartment, because he knew they would not be there." We disagree and explain.
In Osborne v. State, 4 Md. App. 57, 60, 241 A.2d 171 (1967), Chief Judge Murphy (now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals) explained that
robbery is larceny from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear. Harrison v. State, 3 Md. App. 148, 238 A.2d 153 [152 (1968)]. More specifically, to constitute robbery, the property must, as in larceny, be both taken and carried away, so that an asportation of the stolen property, as well as a trespass, would appear to be indispensable elements of the offense. To constitute an asportation, the robber, like the thief in larceny, must acquire complete control of the property at least for an instant, but the slightest asportation is sufficient to satisfy that element of the offense. Clark and Marshall on Crimes (6th Edition), ยง 12.12; Perkins on Criminal Law, p. 275.
See also McCord v. State, 15 Md. App. 63, 71, 289 A.2d 7 (1971) (asserting that a "hair's breadth" asportation is sufficient.) In Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 667, 566 A.2d 111 (1989), the Court of Appeals explained that a criminal attempt is
governed by a 'substantial step' test, whereby a defendant will be found guilty of attempt only where the evidence demonstrates that he took 'substantial steps towards the commission of crime whether or not his intention [to commit that crime] be accomplished. . . that no 'substantial step' will be found unless the conduct is 'strongly corroborative' of a criminal intention.
(quoting Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 311, 493 A.2d 352 (1985)).
In State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 280-81, 604 A.2d 489 (1992), the Court of Appeals explained that " principal in the second degree is one who is guilty of felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof in his presence, either actual or constructive." (emphasis in the original) (quoting State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 197, 396 A.2d 1041 (1978), appeal after remand, 290 Md. 76 (1981)). See also Oates v. State, 97 Md. App. 180, 184, 627 A.2d 555 (1993). In the instant case, uncontrove
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