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Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corp.9/26/1994
had the initial burden of showing an absence of material fact or that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and that the owner had met this burden by attaching to its motion a copy of the release which showed on its face a general release of all persons, firms, or corporations. Id. at , . We then held that once the owner had made this prima facie showing, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to show either a genuine factual issue or that the owner was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Defendants here attached to their motion a copy of the Jaramillo release, which on its face purports to release all persons and corporations "who may be jointly or severally liable" with Jaramillo for damages to Plaintiff arising out of the January 1990 accident. Whether this satisfies Defendants' initial burden raises two questions: 1) "may" Defendants have been severally liable with Jaramillo; and 2) did the damages Plaintiff seeks from Defendants arise out of the accident? We believe that the answer to both of these questions is in the affirmative.
As to the first question, Defendants correctly point out that prior to the adoption of comparative fault in this state, an original tortfeasor was held liable for the negligence of subsequent tortfeasors such as physicians. For example, in ), we followed the rule that when a judgment against an original tortfeasor is satisfied, the plaintiff is barred from then recovering from a physician for subsequent malpractice. In so doing, we noted that the reason behind this rule is that "the original wrongdoer is liable for negligence of the physician in treating the injured person." Id. Further, even after the adoption of comparative fault, we assumed that an original tortfeasor "may be liable for the additional harm caused the victim by a physician negligently treating the victim if negligent treatment is the foreseeable result of the original injury [.]" ), certs. dismissed, 107 N.M. 308, 756 P.2d 1203 (1988). Although we recognize that foreseeability of injury is usually a fact question, see , the language in this release--that anyone with whom Jaramillo "may" be jointly or severally liable is released from liability--does not require a factual or legal certainty. Defendants' alleged negligent treatment of Martin's injured leg occurred during rehabilitation for the injury caused by the accident. A fact finder might reasonably have found that the treatment was a foreseeable result of that accident. Consequently, Jaramillo "may" have been severally liable with Defendants for the additional harm done to Martin's leg; therefore, Defendants come within the language of the release as a matter of law.
As to the second question, we again point out that the leg that was allegedly refractured due to Defendants' malpractice was the same leg that had been broken in the January 1990 accident. Indeed, as Plaintiff admitted in her complaint, the refracture occurred during rehabilitation that included "care and treatment of the left femoral fracture," and the refracture was "at the original femoral fracture site." Because of this, we simply do not believe a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants did not arise out of the January 1990 accident as provided in the release, and we hold as a matter of law that it did. Cf. ) (although issue of whether a defendant has breached a duty is generally a fact question to be determined by the jury, it becomes a question of law where no reasonable fact finder could conclude that a breach of duty has occurred), cert. granted (Oct. 29, 1993). Consequently, we hold that Defendants have satisfied their initi
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