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Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corp.9/26/1994
al burden that the release of all claims applies to them.
The burden, therefore, then shifted to Plaintiff to show either a genuine factual issue or that Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See . Plaintiff argues on appeal, as she did below, that the release was at least ambiguous as to whom she intended to release from liability, and that a material issue of fact is raised thereby. Ambiguity arguments prompt "first, an inquiry to determine whether there was an ambiguity in the general release clause, with extrinsic evidence allowed to aid in the determination, and second, if found to be ambiguous, an inquiry to determine the parties' true intent of the meaning to be given to the clause." Id. at , ; see also . Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, we do not believe the terms of the release, read as a whole, were ambiguous. In the absence of evidence showing otherwise, we assume that Jaramillo's purpose in entering into the settlement was to put an end to her potential liability in this matter either to the injured person or anyone else seeking contribution. See . The terms of the release, which covered persons with whom she might be severally liable, were broad enough to accomplish that purpose.
Further, the only extrinsic evidence offered by Plaintiff on the issue of ambiguity was an affidavit signed by Plaintiff in which she stated that the settlement was not intended to release Defendants from liability. The affidavit asserted, in pertinent part, the following:
On February 6, 1991, I [Plaintiff] entered into a settlement agreement regarding the auto accident on behalf of myself and my son. That settlement agreement was intended only to release Nancy Jaramillo, the opposing driver in the January 27, 1990 accident, her representatives, and all who might be liable through her. It was certainly never intended that Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corporation, and/or Healthsouth of New Mexico, Inc. and/or Mercedes Chavez, be released. They were not parties to the suit regarding the January 27, 1990, accident and were never involved in the negotiations nor the signing of the release. I always saw their actions as separate and distinct from the actions of Mrs. Jaramillo. I always thought of the injury , which they caused my son, as being a new injury which was not Nancy Jaramillo's fault. I am seeking damages against Mercedes Chavez and her employers because they are responsible for rebreaking Martin's leg and, further, causing him to have long term problems that he would not have had if they had not rebroken it.
(Emphasis added.) We believe the emphasized sentences show that Plaintiff's affidavit was only a statement of her own intent in signing the release. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes as much in her supplemental brief. As we held in Perea, however, an attempt to raise a factual issue about the intent in a plaintiff's own mind is insufficient to establish that a release is ambiguous. . Consequently, we hold that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in this case, and that Defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly granted. See id. at ,
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LYNN PICKARD, Judge
WE CONCUR:
PAMELA B. MINZNER, Chief Judge
BRUCE D. BLACK, Judge
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