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Goldstein v. Christiansen9/14/1994
ition of law asserts that the court of appeals erred in sua sponte dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition without allowing for the introduction of evidence and further proceedings as provided by Loc.App.R. sof the Lucas County Court of Appeals. Appellants claim that " he presentation of a stipulation of facts would have been in the interest of justice as there were conflicting statements of fact below particularly concerning facts allegedly constituting Goldstein's 'transacting business' in Ohio." However, as noted previously, the resolution of conflicting statements of fact before Judge Christiansen in the underlying case was solely for him to decide, after construing the evidence most favorably to the opponents of appellants' Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion. An after-the-fact stipulation purportedly "resolving" this conflict would not have been appropriate evidence in the prohibition action. Based upon appellants' complaint and exhibits attached and incorporated therein, they could prove no set of facts entitling them to a writ of prohibition and dismissal was appropriate.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing appellants' complaint for a writ of prohibition is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., A.W. SWEENEY, WRIGHT, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.
RESNICK, J., not participating.
_____________________ Footnote:
1 Since appellants arguably transacted business in Ohio pursuant to Ohio's long-arm statute and rule, appellants' fifth proposition of law, which asserts that the "tortious injury " provision of the long-arm statute and rule did not apply, is moot. Additionally, we note that Judge Christiansen's claim that the General Assembly intended the long-arm statute "to give jurisdiction to the limits of the Due Process Clause" is erroneous, since that interpretation would render the first part of the court's two-part analysis nugatory. See, e.g., McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules Practice (2 Ed.1992) 49, Section 3.10 ("Ohio has not extended long-arm jurisdiction to the limits of due process"); 4 Harper & Solimine, Anderson's Ohio Civil Practice (Supp.1993) 37, Section 150.33 ("If there was an equivalence, presumably the first part of the test could be redundant."); 1 Casad, supra, at 4-8 to 4-9, Section 4.01 . However, any error in this regard was harmless, since Judge Christiansen still applied the appropriate two-part analysis and under that analysis, there was no patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction.
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