 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Komornik v. Sparks8/26/1993
atory verdicts in making our streets and highways safe for travel. The fear of arrest is more of a deterrent than a verdict in a civil case for damages."
In defining "actual malice" in the instant case, the majority states: "Zenobia returned to the Davis v. Gordon test of 'conduct . . . characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, i.e., "actual malice."' Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652. That is the test that we apply here." Md. at , A.2d at (Majority Op. at 11). The majority is incorrect. The test for "actual malice" that was formulated and applied in Zenobia was not the Davis test. Instead, the test applied in Zenobia was (1) actual knowledge of the product's defect, and (2) conscious or deliberate disregard of, or a willful refusal to recognize, foreseeable harm. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 462, 601 A.2d at 653-54. That test is no where found in, or distilled from, the definition of actual malice discussed in Davis. Zenobia recognized that the Davis test for "actual malice" did not work in products liability cases, so the Court formulated a new test which it called "the equivalent" of the actual malice that was discussed in Davis. The Davis test for "actual malice" does not work any better in other tort cases than it does in products liability cases. We should not simply parrot an ineffective standard. We should do as we did in Zenobia -- formulate an "equivalent" test. Instead of expanding the dicta in Zenobia about an antiquated definition of actual malice which the Court did not apply, we should expand the holding in Zenobia and the actual test the Court applied in Zenobia.
I would further note that, although purporting to simply return to the Davis "actual malice" definition, the majority in fact modifies that definition. The actual malice test the majority adopts, and attributes to Davis, is conduct "characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will or fraud. . . ." Md. at , A.2d at (Majority Op. at 11). That is not the Davis test. The actual Davis test is "to entitle one to such [punitive] damages there must be an element of fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression entering into and forming part of the wrongful act." Davis, 183 Md. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701. The test articulated by the majority is a subtle but significant modification of the test articulated in Davis. The majority added "intent to injure" and "ill will" to the Davis test, and it removed "malice" and "oppression." The majority apparently recognizes that Davis's "actual malice" test is inadequate and alters it. If the majority is going to alter the Davis test, it should do so in a more helpful manner. Instead of resurrecting and subtly modifying an antiquated definition of actual malice, which gives insufficient guidance to judges or juries, we should do just as we did in Zenobia and establish a more meaningful "equivalent" of those words.
In setting out its "actual malice" criteria for punitive damages, the majority seems to approve "evil motive" and "ill will" as alternatives to its new "intent to injure" requirement. If a defendant acts with "ill will" or "evil motive," apparently the defendant does not have to intend to do the specific act and/or intend that the act will cause injury. The majority's test seems to be an alternative of either Davis's punishable frame of mind (evil motive and ill will) or punishable state of mind (intent to injure). Any test for punitive damages should do as Zenobia did and clearly set out the requirements of an intentional act and recognition of foreseeable injury. We should jettison vague terms like "evil motive" or "il
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|