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Komornik v. Sparks8/26/1993
nt, and delayed reactions. Under Komornik's analogy, other users of the highway are compared to those members of the public who come in contact with a defective product. They are placed "at high risk." Brief of Appellant at 11. The submission is that "just as the corporate defendant does not chose a specific victim to be injured by the consciously marketed defective product . . ., the voluntarily intoxicated operator of a motor vehicle takes his victims from the highway at random." Id. Komornik concludes that Sparks's "repeated decision to become severely intoxicated and operate a motor vehicle on the highways, putting all who [lawfully] are on those roadways . . . at severe risk . . . is the equivalent or worse than [the conduct] recognized . . . in Zenobia as being sufficiently egregious to warrant a punitive award." Id. at 12.
The Maryland Trial Lawyers' Association joins in the foregoing submission in an amicus curiae brief.
The analogy is flawed. When the supplier of a defective product puts the product into the stream of commerce the supplier surrenders control over the product to a large extent (excluding warnings, recalls, and the like). If the supplier relinquishes control with actual knowledge of the defect and "a conscious or deliberate disregard of the foreseeable harm," Zenobia, 325 Md. at 462, 601 A.2d at 653, the supplier acts with "actual malice." Here, Sparks had not relinquished control of the truck; he was trying to control it. While the evidence was sufficient to show that Sparks had actual knowledge that he was intoxicated, the evidence also shows that he was not consciously disregarding the consequences of his drunkenness. He was trying to stop the truck which would have been stopped under similar circumstances by a sober driver. Sparks, admittedly, was negligent and liable to compensate the victims of his negligence. For purposes of punitive damages under Zenobia, however, characterizing the degree of the negligence is immaterial. The relevant inquiry for punitive damages is whether the proof shows conduct characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud.
Essentially Komornik argues that a jury could find that Sparks's conduct manifests a "conscious or deliberate disregard of the foreseeable harm." Id. at 462, 601 A.2d at 653. But Komornik's effort to dilute the standard of actual malice, as defined in Zenobia, and to return to some form of imputed malice, fails to appreciate the effect of Zenobia's overruling of Smith and of Nast, and the effect of its return to the standard of Davis v. Gordon. Both effects were integral to the principle governing punitive damages.
The relevant Maryland legal history may be reviewed quickly. In Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944), a pedestrian, walking along the shoulder of a road at night, was struck and instantly killed by a motorist. The plaintiff-administrator was granted an instruction under which the jury could, and did, award punitive damages if it found that the motorist was "grossly and wantonly negligent in the operation of his automobile." Davis v. Gordon, Record Extract at 36. This Court reversed, saying that "in this State that [instruction] is not the test." Davis, 183 Md. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701. "On the contrary, . . . there must be an element of fraud, or malice, or evil intent . . . ." Id. The issue was revisited in dicta in Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 257 A.2d 187 (1969), where the Court said:
"The difficulty in the Maryland cases arises in regard to factual
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