SMITH v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.
8/9/1993
Garfield Smith (Smith) as administrator of the estate of Dennis Smith (the deceased) sued Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) to recover medical and funeral expenses. The decedent was struck by a car while riding his bicycle on August 22, 1990, in Jasper County, South Carolina. He died as a result of the accident. The car was registered to a Georgia resident, Carolyn Middlebrooks. Middlebrooks was the named insured and was not related to the deceased. The court awarded Smith $4,000 under the
The pertinent language of the policy reads:
The Company will pay
(a) medical expenses,
(d) funeral expenses,
incurred with respect to bodily injury sustained
by an eligible injured person and caused by an
accident arising out of the operation, maintenance
or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle.
Exclusions
This coverage does not apply
(f) to bodily injury sustained by any
pedestrian, other than the named insured or
any relative, as a result of being struck by a
motor vehicle outside the State of Georgia;
* * * * * *
Definitions
When used in reference to this coverage
"eligible injured person" means
(a) the named insured or any relative who
sustains bodily injury while occupying, or while a
pedestrian as a result of being struck by, any motor
vehicle;
(b) any other person who sustains bodily injury
while occupying, or while a pedestrian as a result
of being struck by the insured motor vehicle;
We are bound by the general rules of contract construction when interpreting insurance policies. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Marine Contracting & Towing, 301 S.C. 418, 421, 392 S.E.2d 460, 461 (1990). It is well settled that in the absence of ambiguity, the terms of a policy are to be taken in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Barkley v. International Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 38, 43, 86 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1955). Furthermore, courts will not extend coverage, not agreed to by the parties, by judicial construction. See South Carolina Ins. Co. v. White, 310 S.C. 133, 390 S.E.2d 471 (Ct.App. 1990).
The trial court found the policy ambiguous as to whether the decedent was an eligible insured person. We find no such ambiguity. In our opinion, the definition of "eligible injured person" clearly includes protection for the insured, and his or her relatives, when injured by any vehicle, and protection for other persons only when injured by the insured vehicle. The policy specifically excludes the latter when the injury occurs outside the state of Georgia. We find the meaning of this language very clear and find no need for interpretation.
Additionally, Smith argues that the trial court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that the denial of benefits based on kinship and citizenship was unconscionable and against the public policy. We disagree.
The policy language does not condition the allocation or denial of benefits on the claimant's citizenship. To the contrary, it excludes "any pedestrian" who is struck by the insured vehicle while outside the State of Georgia. The language does not differentiate between citizens of states
At the time of the accident, Georgia law provided that PIP benefits could be awarded for " ccidential bodily injury sustained by any other person [not the named insured or a relative] as a result of being struck by the owner's motor vehicle while a pedestrian in this state." O.C.G.A. ยง 33-34-7 (a) (3) (1990) (repealed 1991). The majority of Chapter 34 was repealed and revised effective October 1, 1991.
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