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Reider v. Dawson12/3/1992
In this personal injury action arising from an alleged automobile accident, plaintiffs, Garland Willard Reider and Victoria Cordova Reider, appeal from the summary judgment which dismissed their claims against defendants, Robert Dennis Dawson, the Eagle County Sheriff's Department (Department), and the Eagle County Board of County Commissioners. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
According to the complaint filed January 22, 1991, plaintiff Garland Reider was severely injured on November 24, 1989, when a vehicle belonging to the Department and operated by Officer Dawson within the scope of his employment with the Department, struck and ran over plaintiff who had just departed his disabled vehicle. Plaintiff Victoria Reider's derivative claims were for loss of consortium.
The Department and the Board filed an answer to the complaint which admitted that plaintiff's vehicle had left the roadway in an automobile accident and that a Departmental vehicle driven by Dawson, a deputy sheriff, had responded to the scene. However, those defendants denied that the Department's vehicle had struck plaintiff. The answer asserted, among other defenses, that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in § 13-80-103(1)(c), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A).
All defendants joined in a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) on the grounds (1) that the complaint failed to state any claim against the Board and (2) that the claims against Dawson and the Department were barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in § 13-80-103(1)(c), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A).
Plaintiffs filed an objection to the motion, with supporting exhibits, asserting, among other grounds, that claims based upon an automobile-pedestrian collision are governed by the three-year limitation period for actions under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, § 13-80-101(1)(j), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A), and that, therefore, their complaint was timely filed. Defendants filed a reply to plaintiffs' objection, accompanied by a supporting affidavit of Deputy Dawson.
Following the submission of additional written briefs, the trial court concluded that the motion should be construed as one for summary judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56. It also determined that the Board was a separate entity from the Department, that no basis for liability on the part of the Board had been shown, and that no factual issue existed to preclude the Board's dismissal from the action.
The trial court also determined that, because the allegations against Dawson were solely in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff and because plaintiff Garland Reider knew the alleged cause of his own injuries on the date of the accident, the one-year statute of limitations barred plaintiffs' claims against Dawson and the Department.
The judgment was certified to be final pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b).
I.
On appeal, plaintiffs do not challenge the trial court's determination that the Board was a separate entity from the Department and that no factual issue precluded the Board's dismissal as a matter of law. Accordingly, because the propriety of this ruling is not before us, we affirm that portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against the Eagle County Board of County Commissioners without further Discussion. See Sanchez v. State,730 P.2d 328(Colo. 1986); BQP Industries, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization,694 P.2d 337(Colo.
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