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Nott v. Homan12/17/1992
SHAW, Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants, Willis Clapper and Judy Nott, appeal the judgment of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, following a jury trial in the personal injury action brought by plaintiffs against defendant-appellee, Deanna Homan.
On December 29, 1988, a van driven by plaintiff Clapper, in which plaintiff Nott was a passenger, was involved in an accident with a car driven by defendant, at the intersection of U.S. 127 and S.R. 119 in Mercer County.
On September 28, 1990, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant, alleging that defendant's negligence caused the accident and seeking damages for the resulting injuries. On May 30, 1991, the parties stipulated that defendant was solely liable. A jury trial on the issue of damages only was held on November 6 and 7, 1991. The jury returned a verdict of $10,000 for Nott and a verdict of $11,500 for Clapper.
Defendant then filed a motion to reduce the verdicts by the amount of any collateral benefits received, pursuant to R.C. 2317.45. On March 17, 1992, the trial court issued a judgment entry journalizing the verdicts. Finding that R.C. 2317.45 mandated such action, the court reduced Nott's award by $2,282.05 and reduced Clapper's award by $5,357.15. A mistake in the entry relating to the source of benefits received by Clapper was corrected by a nunc pro tunc entry filed March 23, 1992, but the reduced judgments, as journalized March 17, 1992, remained unchanged.
Plaintiffs thereafter brought the instant appeal, raising the following two assignments of error:
"I. The court erred in refusing to give the jury an instruction that they should not consider any possible collateral or third-party sources of payment available to plaintiffs relative to their damages.
"II. The court erred in reducing the judgment for the plaintiffs under the terms of R.C. Section 2317.45(B)."
The plaintiffs' assignments of error both relate to R.C. 2317.45. This statutory section, which is set forth in detail, infra, abrogates the common-law collateral source rule in many Ohio tort actions.
In their first assignment of error, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' request that the court give the following jury instruction, based on the language of R.C. 2317.45(B)(3):
"The jury shall not consider any possible collateral or third-party sources of payment available to plaintiffs relative to their damages."
R.C. 2317.45(B)(3) provides:
"Except as provided in division (B)(1) of this section, in another section of the Revised Code, or in the Rules of Evidence, evidence of collateral benefits is not admIssible in a tort action and shall not be submitted to or considered by the trier of fact in determining whether to award compensatory damages to a plaintiff in a tort action or in determining the amount of any such damages."
Plaintiffs contend that evidence of collateral benefits was impermissibly submitted to, and considered by, the jury. Specifically, several records documenting the plaintiffs' injuries and their medical expenses were attached to copies of insurance claim forms. Thus, plaintiffs assert, the trial court erred in failing to issue the requested "curative" instruction.
As noted by the plaintiffs, Ohio's General Assembly has recognized that evidence of collateral benefits received by a plaintiff could alter the jury's perception of a plaintiff's damages, and could substantially and unfairly reduce an award for damages suffered. Therefore, R.C. 2317.45(B) precludes the admission of such evidence, in order to protect tort action plaint
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