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Batson v. Shiflett3/12/1992
quently, the Court held that a state is not preempted from applying its libel laws to statements made in the context of labor-management relations, so long as the state applies a standard no more inclusive than that announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 706 (1964): that the defamatory statements must have been published with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their falsity, and that a plaintiff can recover damages only upon proof that the statements caused actual injury.
This exception to the Garmon rule was justified on several grounds. First, the Court noted that the underlying conduct -- the intentional circulation of defamatory material known to be false -- was not protected under the NLRA, and thus, there was no risk that permitting the state cause of action to proceed would result in state regulation of conduct that Congress intended to protect. Second, state regulation of malicious defamation is "merely a peripheral concern" of the NLRA, and the state has an overriding interest in protecting its citizens from malicious libel. This interest is "'so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility' that it fits within the exception specifically carved out by Garmon." Id. 383 U.S. at 62, 86 S.Ct. at 663, 15 L.Ed.2d at 589. Third, since the NLRA does not prescribe any procedure for dealing with tortious conduct, existing liabilities
for such conduct are not eliminated. Thus, while the NLRB may find that the defamation violates ยง 8 and justifies setting aside an election, " he injury that the statement might cause to an individual's reputation . . . has no relevance to the Board's function." Id. at 63, 86 S.Ct. at 663, 15 L.Ed.2d at 590. Fourth, the NLRB "can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other relief to the defamed individual." Id. This "lack of concern with the 'personal' injury caused by malicious libel, together with [the NLRB's] inability to provide redress to the maligned party, vitiates the ordinary arguments for pre-emption." Id. at 64, 86 S.Ct. at 663-64, 15 L.Ed.2d at 590. The Court observed that damages for personal injuries should be assessed without regard to the merits of the labor controversy, and also suggested that an excessive damage remedy might be preempted.
In Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977), the Supreme Court fully adopted its Linn rationale in recognizing that state courts retained jurisdiction over claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress brought against union officers. Plaintiff union member alleged that because he had a disagreement with local union officers, the union refused to refer him out of the union hiring hall and reacted to his complaint against this discrimination with "a campaign of personal abuse and harassment in addition to continued discrimination in referrals." The Farmer Court emphasized that the NLRA does not protect "outrageous conduct" by union officers, and the state has a substantial interest in prohibiting such conduct, an interest no less worthy of protection than damage to reputation. The Court opined that although plaintiff's challenge of the union's conduct, as in Linn, risks interference with the NLRA, because the discrimination in hiring hall referrals would make out an unfair labor practice, this risk does not counterbalance the substantial state interest in protecting its citizens. If the charges in the complaint were filed with the NLRB, the Court instructed, the Board would not consider the union's
conduct that allegedly caused emotional distress and physical injury. Conversely, the state court action could be adjudicated without consid
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