 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Batson v. Shiflett3/12/1992
ion of funds and accused other local officers of sharing in expense monies, warning them not to get too close to Shiflett.
Shiflett presented evidence that the convening of a special meeting of Local 33 membership by the petitioners was unprecedented in union history. Batson allegedly told those present that over four hundred intra-union theft charges were being brought against Shiflett and that he was guilty, even though no trial board hearing had taken place. Petitioners repeated these accusations to Bethlehem officials and in two later meetings with Local 33. Batson openly pronounced to the National Union convention delegates from the entire country that he would "punish" and "nail"
Shiflett and remove him from office for entering into the unauthorized agreement with Bethlehem. He stated that regardless of the outcome of the unfair labor practice litigation, he was going to "get" Shiflett, "even if I wind up on 60 Minutes or 20/20."
From this circumstantial evidence the jury could have inferred that petitioners' improper motives established that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. Such "actual malice," together with the defamatory nature of the publications and falsity of the accusations of criminal misconduct are highly relevant and constitute substantial circumstantial evidence regarding Batson's subjective state of mind when he made those statements. This evidence was sufficient for the jury's finding of clear and convincing proof that petitioners' statements constituted actionable defamation.
Finally, petitioners argue that the trial court's jury instruction allowed the jury to decide the case based on the lesser standard of common law malice rather than based on the "actual malice" standard and, thus, requires reversal. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on "actual malice" but also instructed that Batson had a "conditional privilege" to advise union members of matters relating to the union's activities. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the "privilege" could be lost merely by a showing of common law malice:
"The conditional privilege may be lost if abused. Abuse occurs when the statement is made with one, knowledge that it is false or made with a reckless disregard for its truth; or 2, is not made in furtherance of the interest for which the privilege exists; or 3, it is communicated to a third person other than one whose hearing is reasonably believed to be necessary or useful to the protection of the interest; or 4, it is made with ill will, hostility, hatred or lack of good faith."
See Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 139, 387 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1978) (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth is the standard of malice required to defeat the defense of conditional privilege). Thus, the petitioners argue that the jury may well have decided this case on the basis of common law malice rather than "actual malice."
Assuming, arguendo, that petitioners have preserved this issue for appeal, the error was harmless under the circumstances of this case. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the standard for New York Times "actual malice." The jury was instructed that the actual malice standard is not satisfied through a showing of ill will, hatred, spite or malice in the ordinary sense of the term. The jury was told that to satisfy the actual malice standard Shiflett had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that petitioners made defamatory statements knowing the statements were false or with reckless disregard as to whether they were t
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|