Batson v. Shiflett3/12/1992
dict, the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages against the National Union and Batson was not apportioned between their liabilities for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court denied the motions of National Union and Batson for judgment N.O.V. and for a new trial.
II.
Petitioners assert that the administrative law judge's factual findings should have precluded any finding by the jury that Shiflett was defamed in Flyer No. 3. They argue:
"Flyer No. 3 accused Shiflett of: 1) conspiring with Bethlehem Steel; 2) perjuring himself before the NLRB; 3) backdating documents; and 4) illegally ratifying a labor contract. If the NLRB's fact-findings are credited, each of these statements is true, and, therefore, could not
be tortious. The trial judge nevertheless allowed the case to proceed, and instructed the jury accordingly that it was free to consider these factual issues for itself, notwithstanding the NLRB's prior determination. The jury then heard much of the same evidence the NLRB heard, and reached the opposite conclusion; it found the statements false, and equally improperly, found them tortious."
This claim of "issue preclusion" is properly characterized as the defense of "collateral estoppel." See Murray International v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547, 555 A.2d 502, 503-04 (1989); Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 227-28, 443 A.2d 98, 101-02 (1982). This Court has repeatedly recognized that there is a distinction between the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Welsh v. Gerber Products, 315 Md. 510, 516, 555 A.2d 486, 489 (1989); Mackall, 293 Md. at 227, 443 A.2d at 101; Bankers & Ship. Ins. v. Electro Enter., 287 Md. 641, 652, 415 A.2d 278, 284 (1980); Cook v. State, 281 Md. 665, 668-69, 381 A.2d 671, 673, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839, 99 S.Ct. 126, 58 L.Ed.2d 136 (1978); MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 32, 367 A.2d 486, 488-89 (1977); Sterling v. Local 438, etc., 207 Md. 132, 140-41, 113 A.2d 389, 393, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875, 76 S.Ct. 119, 100 L.Ed.2d 773 (1955). See LeBrun v. Marcey, 199 Md. 223, 226-27, 86 A.2d 512, 514 (1952). This distinction was aptly expressed in Mackall:
" f a proceeding between parties involves the same cause of action as a previous proceeding between the same parties, the principle of res judicata applies and all matters actually litigated or that could have been litigated are conclusive in the subsequent proceeding. If a proceeding between parties does not involve the same cause of action as a previous proceeding between the same parties, the principle of collateral estoppel applies, and only those facts or issues actually litigated in the previous action are conclusive in the subsequent proceeding."
293 Md. at 228, 443 A.2d at 102 (citations omitted). Here, the initial proceeding involved an administrative action to
remedy an alleged unfair labor practice, whereas the subsequent judicial proceeding involved common law tort actions. Manifestly, the two cases involve different causes of action; therefore, the principles of collateral estoppel apply. Shiflett argues that this defense is neither available in nor applicable to the instant dispute. We shall address each of the assertions separately.
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