Batson v. Shiflett3/12/1992
cting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly
before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose."
Id. at 422, 86 S.Ct. at 1560, 16 L.Ed.2d at 661. Thus, agency findings made in the course of proceedings that are judicial in nature should be given the same preclusive effect as findings made by a court. Prongs one and two of the Exxon test incorporate these considerations. Since Utah Constr. Co., collateral estoppel routinely has been applied to factual determinations made by federal agencies following a fair adversarial hearing. West Coast Truck Lines v. American Industries, 893 F.2d 229, 234-35 (9th Cir.1990) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Frye v. United Steelworkers of America, 767 F.2d 1216, 1219-21 (7th Cir.) (NLRB), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007, 106 S.Ct. 530, 88 L.Ed.2d 461 (1985); Consolidated Exp., Inc. v. New York Shipping, Inc., 602 F.2d 494, 503 (3d Cir.1979) (NLRB), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902, 100 S.Ct. 3040, 65 L.Ed.2d 1131 (1980); Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137, 143- 45 (2d Cir.) (Federal Maritime Commission), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 241, 27 L.Ed.2d 246 (1970); Hudson-Berlind Corp. v. Local 807, Intern. Broth., 597 F.Supp. 1282, 1286-87 (E.D.N.Y.1984) (NLRB); Chocallo v. Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, SSA, 548 F.Supp. 1349, 1362 (E.D.Pa.1982) (Merit Systems Protections Board), aff'd, 716 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983, 104 S.Ct. 426, 78 L.Ed.2d 360 (1983); Spancrete Northeast v. International Ass'n, etc., 514 F.Supp. 326, 331 (N.D.N.Y.) (NLRB), aff'd, 679 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.1981); Moore v. Allied Chemical Corp., 480 F.Supp. 377, 382-87 (E.D.Va.1979) (Occupational Health and Safety Administration); Whitman Elec. Inc. v. Local 363, Int. Bro. of Elec. W., 398 F.Supp. 1218, 1221 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (NLRB). Compare these cases where collateral estoppel did not apply, City of Pompano Beach v. F.A.A., 774 F.2d 1529, 1538-39 n. 10 (11th Cir.1985) (Federal Aviation Administration); Rosenfeld v. Department of Army, 769 F.2d 237, 240-41 (4th Cir.1985) (Civil Service Commission); Pantex Towing Corp. v. Glidewell, 763 F.2d 1241, 1245-46
(11th Cir.1985) (NLRB); Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801, 806-07 (D.C.Cir.1979) (Civil Service Commission's Office of Federal Equal Employment Opportunity); Associated Indus. of N.Y.S., Inc. v. United States Dept. of L., 487 F.2d 342, 350 n. 10 (2d Cir.1973) (Department of Labor); Pygatt v. Painters' Local No. 277, 763 F.Supp. 1301, 1307 (D.N.J.1991) (NLRB); Horton v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 570 F.Supp. 1120, 1121-22 (N.D.Miss.1983) (Social Security Administration); Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 512 F.Supp. 1266, 1269 (D.Mass.1981) (Office of Ship Construction); Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Driv. & Dairy Emp. Loc. U. No. 584, 281 F.Supp. 971, 974-75 (E.D.N.Y.1968) (NLRB).
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), the Court discussed the distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel, remarking that:
"Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action."
Id. at 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. at 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d at 559 n. 5 (emphasis added). These factors are incorporated in prongs two and three of the Exxon test, that
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