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Francis v. Cleveland3/9/1992
JOHN F. CORRIGAN, Judge.
Plaintiffs Althea Francis and her minor daughter Charlethea appeal from the order of the trial court which awarded summary judgment to defendants city of Cleveland, Cleveland Police Chief Howard Rudolf, and Cleveland Police officers Donald Falcoski and Alan Sardon in plaintiffs' action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and other causes of action. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On September 26, 1986, Falcoski and sardon responded to a complaint that shots were fired in the area of East 116th Street and Continental Avenue. The officers learned that a man matching the description of the suspect entered a house at 305 East 116th Street, and they obtained consent to search the premises from Althea Francis (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff"). After the search had proceeded for a time, plaintiff revoked her consent to search. An altercation then ensued, and the officers arrested plaintiff and handcuffed her hands behind her back. Thereafter, plaintiff, who was approximately eight and one-half months pregnant, complained of abdominal pain and was taken to St. Luke's Hospital, where she remained overnight.
On September 27, 1986, Officer Falcoski swore complaints against plaintiff for assault on a police officer and resisting arrest. These complaints were in turn approved by Assistant Cleveland Prosecutor Verna Lanham, and filed with the court later that day.
The charges proceeded to trial on January 28, 1987, and plaintiff was found not guilty of assault, and guilty of resisting arrest. Thereafter, plaintiff was granted a new trial on the charge of resisting arrest, and was acquitted of this charge on December 9, 1987.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed an action against defendants in federal district court. The district court dismissed the action and on March 23, 1989, plaintiffs filed this action against defendants for, inter alia, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On April 6, 1990, defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting as their primary defense that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted this motion on May 23, 1990 and plaintiffs now appeal.
Plaintiffs' first assignment of error states:
"Plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the statute of limitations."
Within this assignment of error, plaintiffs contend that, pursuant to McClure v. Middletown Hosp. Assn. (S.D. Ohio 1985), 603 F.Supp. 1365, the "primary purpose" of a statute of limitations is to give a party notice of potential actions against him. Plaintiffs further contend that purpose has been met here because defendants were given "ample and adequate notice" of their claims when the action was first filed in the federal court. These contentions lack merit.
As set forth in McClure v. Middletown Hosp. Assn., the primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to "reduce to a fixed interval the time between thsaccrual of a right of action and the commencement of the action, and to put all on notice as to that interval." Such statutes are designed to protect persons from the burden of having to defend against stale claims. Id. Accordingly, plaintiffs' reliance upon McClure v. Middletown Hosp. Assn. is misplaced.
Further, while the time within which to commence an action may be extended upon notice that the claimant is considering bringing an action, this provision pertains only to medical, dental, optometric, and chiropractic practice claims. R.C. 2305.11(B). As these claims are not implicated here, R.C. 2305.11(B) has no ap
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