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Helton v. Coleman5/7/1991
ns, 565 P.2d 4 (Okla. 1977), and Winters v. City of Oklahoma City, 740 P.2d 724 (Okla. 1987), as support for a finding that the sanctions were proper under the trial court's inherent powers. In Owens, plaintiff brought suit which went to trial before a jury. After three days of trial and prior to being submitted to the jury for deliberation, plaintiff dismissed his case without prejudice. The trial court allowed the dismissal with the further order that plaintiff's refiling of the cause was conditioned upon payment of defendant's attorney fees for legal services provided during the trial of the case. We found the plaintiff's actions oppressive and a waste of defendant's time and money in defending a lawsuit which was presented in entirety to a jury but never submitted to them for resolution. Because the actions of plaintiff were oppressive, we found that the trial court, "in the exercise of its inherent equitable powers, did not exceed its jurisdiction, powers, or discretion" in assessing attorney fees against the plaintiff. 565 P.2d, at 9.
Winters was the logical extension of the doctrine announced in Owens. In Winters, we held that when an attorney acts in bad faith or oppressively, the trial court, in the exercise of its inherent equitable powers, can tax against that attorney all unnecessary expenses incurred because of the misconduct. We characterized the taxing of such costs as a sanction which "should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing." 740 P.2d, at 727 (Emphasis added). See also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2464, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980). Thus, our earlier emphasis upon notice and an opportunity to be heard becomes clear.
In Ford v. Ford, 766 P.2d 950, 954 (Okla. 1988), the Court of Appeals ordered the attorney of one of the parties to pay one-half of his attorney fee awarded by the trial court to the court clerk on the grounds that it was improperly granted against the opposing party. We overturned the Court of Appeals order finding it facially void because the attorney was not a party to the proceeding and had not been given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, the order was a violation of the attorney's Fourteenth Amendment rights, and such is the case herein. Young and Cowan face the deprivation of a property interest without due process of law. Regardless of the magnitude of their misconduct, they were entitled to notice of the sanctions and an opportunity to be heard. The trial court abused its authority in sanctioning appellants without such notice and hearing.
III.
Accordingly, the portion of the Court of Appeals opinion concerning the assessment of jury fees against Young and Cowan is VACATED and the order of the trial court imposing the sanction of jury costs is REVERSED. The order of the Court of Appeals granting new trial is left undisturbed.
LAVENDER, DOOLIN, HARGRAVE and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.
OPALA, C.J., concurs in result.
KAUGER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
HODGES, V.C.J., and ALMA WILSON, J., dissent.
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