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PIERCE v. GROVE MFG. CO. INC.6/8/1990
Grove Manufacturing Company, Inc., the defendant in a wrongful death action brought by Marie Pierce, seeks an interlocutory appeal of a pretrial discovery order entered by the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) under the "death knell" or "collateral order" exceptions to the final judgment rule. This case does not fall within either exception, and therefore the present appeal is dismissed.
I.
The facts are largely undisputed. In 1986, a steel worker named Jon Pierce was electrocuted to death when a crane carrying a steel beam that Pierce was guiding by hand struck a power line. In 1986, Marie Pierce, the widow of Jon Pierce and personal representative of his estate, brought a wrongful death action against the crane manufacturer, Grove Manufacturing Company, Inc., asserting that Grove acted negligently by failing to equip the crane with a proximity warning device that detects the presence of electrical wires. A company named Sigalarm manufactured these warning devices. During discovery, Pierce requested from Grove all documents regarding Grove's prior dealings with Sigalarm in order to develop evidence to combat Grove's allegations that the proximity warning devices were "undependable" and "terribly insidious, dangerous product ."
Grove, Sigalarm, and 16 other parties had previously been involved in an antitrust suit in federal district court in California ("the Sigalarm case"). Before the Sigalarm case settled, the California court issued a protective order, which Grove maintains still has effect, prohibiting dissemination of any documents pertaining to the Sigalarm case. Grove objected to Pierce's document request, claiming the Sigalarm documents sought are both irrelevant and "confidential and privileged." Pierce then moved to compel discovery, and Grove filed a memorandum supporting its opposition to Pierce's motion to compel.
Upon determining that the information Pierce sought was "highly relevant" to this case, the Superior Court granted Pierce's motion to compel, and ordered disclosure subject to a protective order to be drafted by the parties. Grove then filed a motion for protection (from the Superior Court's August 8th order) or for reconsideration (of the Superior Court's August 8th order). The Superior Court denied this motion. Grove filed notice of appeal to the Law Court under the "death knell" and "collateral order" exceptions to the final judgment rule. Pierce contends that Grove's notice of appeal was untimely filed.
II.
The primary question before us is whether Grove's appeal fits within one of the exceptions to the final judgment rule. It is well established that under the final judgment rule interlocutory orders are generally not appealable. Blessing v. Dow Chemical Co., 521 A.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Me. 1987); Moshe Myerowitz, D.C., P.A. v. Howard, 507 A.2d 578, 579-80 (Me. 1986). See also 2 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 73.1 (2d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1981). Over the years, however, we have recognized a few narrowly defined exceptions to the final judgment rule. Moshe Myerowitz, 507 A.2d at 580. See also 2 Field, McKusick & Wroth, §§ 73.1-73.5. Grove
Grove first argues that this dispute is appealable under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule, which permits an interlocutory appeal where the issue pressed on appeal would be effectively mooted and substantial rights of a party would be irreparably lost if review were to be delayed until final judgment. State v. Maine State Employees Association, 482 A.2d 461, 464 (Me. 1984); Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340, 343, n. 8 (Me. 1979). Put differently, "where an interlocutory order has the practical effect of permanent
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