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CHILD v. CENTRAL MAINE MEDICAL CENTER6/8/1990
On the joint motion of the parties, pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 72, this case is before us on the report of an interlocutory ruling of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Alexander, J.) to determine whether Central Maine Medical Center ("CMMC") is a "charitable organization" entitled to immunity from tort liability except as provided in 14 M.R.S.A. § 158 (1980). On the record before us, we conclude that CMMC has not carried its burden of establishing that it is entitled to charitable immunity. Accordingly, we vacate the Superior Court's order holding that CMMC's potential liability for damages in this case is limited to its available insurance coverage.
This medical malpractice action against CMMC seeks damages for the personal injuries suffered by Arnold B. Child, Jr. during his birth on June 14, 1979, as a result the court found that CMMC possessed a number of charitable attributes including the use of volunteer labor, the provision of medical services at no charge or reduced cost to the poor, and the subsidization of a nursing school. The court also found that CMMC was a nonprofit corporation exempt from state and federal taxation. In reviewing CMMC's financial status, the court found that only " omewhere around one percent of the funds [CMMC] received in the relevant years — perhaps less than one percent — are restricted or unrestricted private contributions." Based on these findings, the court concluded that CMMC had sustained its burden of proving that it is a "charitable organization" entitled to immunity subject only to the limitation set forth in section 158. We disagree.
We examine the common law doctrine of charitable immunity, as judicially created, to determine whether CMMC is entitled to that defense. See Thompson v. Mercy Hospital, 483 A.2d 706, 707 (Me. 1984) ("The doctrine of charitable immunity is a creation of the common law. Except for one significant restriction imposed by [section 158], its applicability in Maine is controlled entirely by the precedents of this Court"). Absent a definition of "charitable organization" as used in section 158, we can assume it refers to that kind of organization entitled to charitable immunity under the common law doctrine.
As early as Webber Hospital Association v. McKenzie, 104 Me. 320, 71 A. 1032 (1908), we set forth the constituent elements of a "charitable institution" as follows: (1) that it "has no capital stock and no provision for making dividends or profits" and (2) that it derive its funds "mainly from public and private charity, . . . hold them in trust for the object of the institution." McKenzie, 104 Me. at 329, 71 A. at 1036. It is undisputed that CMMC satisfies the criteria of the first prong; accordingly, we address only the second prong of the McKenzie test. In doing so, we note that this "constituent element" has remained unchanged throughout our case law. See Thompson, 483 A.2d at 707; Mendall v. Pleasant Mountain Ski Development, Inc., 159 Me. 285, 289, 191 A.2d 633, 636 (1963); and Jensen v. Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 411, 78 A. 898, 899 (1910).
In Mendall, based on the trial court's conclusion that all of the State Principals' Association's funds and efforts were expended in furthering education in the public secondary schools, the trial court granted the Association's motion for a summary judgment on the ground that it had charitable immunity. On our review we stated that " e are concerned primarily, however, with the sources of income of the Association." Mendall, 159 Me. at 287, 191 A.2d at 634. In vacating the judgment, we neither broadened nor narrowed the common law doctrine but held that "an organization [such as the Association] which receives and administers virtually no ch
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