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LEFAY v. COOPERSMITH6/5/1990 y, and the amount fixed must stand unless it is apparent from the record that the jury acted under some bias, prejudice or improper influence, or made some mistake of law or fact. Poulette v. Herbert C. Haynes, Inc., 347 A.2d 596, 599 (Me. 1975). We have noted that the trial court is in a far better position than an appellate court to make this determination. Arel v. Poirier, 533 A.2d 1285, 1286-87 (Me. 1987). The trial court's denial of a motion for additur to a verdict or a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages will be reversed only if we determine that the decision was a "clear and manifest abuse of discretion." In reaching our determination, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, deferring to the jury on the issues of credibility. Id. at 1287.
On the issue of damages, the jury heard evidence concerning the nature and duration of pain consciously suffered by Clayton; that this pain would have been reduced by an earlier referral to a neurologist; that an earlier diagnosis of Clayton's condition would not have prevented his death; and that the amount of Clayton's funeral expenses was $3,000. The LeFays testified briefly as to their relationship with Clayton. There was also evidence that on his admission to the Maine Medical Center Clayton had stated, "I have no family." In denying the LeFays' motion, the trial court properly applied the standard set forth in Poulette. Giving deference to any finding the jury may have made as to the credibility of the evidence presented on this issue, we find no clear and manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the LeFays' motion.
IV
With regard to the defendants' cross appeal, we note that 24 M.R.S.A. ยง 2903-A(1) provided no sanctions for a plaintiff's noncompliance with its time limitations. Section 2903-A(3) authorized the court to extend time periods established in the section for good cause and defined good cause, inter alia, as " ny other cause the court determines to require extension . . . in the interest of justice." We also note that no time limit is provided in this section within which a plaintiff must seek an extension. Here, after a hearing on the defendants' motion, the court (Smith, J.) imposed a sanction on the LeFays for noncompliance with section 2903-A(1). The LeFays' motion for reconsideration was submitted to the court on the basis of memoranda by the parties. After reviewing the file and memoranda, the court vacated its previous order for the purpose of allowing the parties to address the issue of good cause for an extension of time to comply with section 2903-A(1). After a hearing on the LeFays' motion for an extension and the defendants' renewed motion for sanctions, the court (Silsby, J.), "in the interest of justice," granted the LeFays' motion and denied the motion of the defendants. On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred in its disposition of these preliminary motions.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
All concurring.
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