 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Cumins v. State6/28/1990
f whether a person understands the question of the court is not a prerequisite to holding one in direct contempt under § 565. See Young v. State, 275 P.2d 358, 368 (Okl.Cr. 1954). Moreover, after reviewing the record, we find that the context in which the questions were asked was abundantly clear.
Finally, we reject appellant's argument that he did not, in fact, refuse to answer the questions of the judge. Rather, appellant claims, "He simply did not get around to answering it because of his preoccupation with the court's bias." We deem this argument completely without merit. The court specifically asked appellant twice whether or not he intended to answer the question. As appellant refused to even answer these questions, we find that the trial court did not err in finding him in contempt.
As his second assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in holding him in contempt because the assertion of judicial bias is constitutionally protected speech. We note, however, that the court did not find appellant in contempt for asserting judicial bias. Rather, appellant was found in contempt for "failing to answer the questions" posed by the court. (Tr. 3). Accordingly, we hold that appellant was not punished for exercising his First Amendment rights.
Appellant finally claims that requiring him to admit ownership of a car would have been tantamount to requiring him to incriminate himself. In support of this proposition, appellant reiterates that he appeared before the court on a charge of Leaving the Scene of an Injury Accident and argues that ownership of an automobile had a direct bearing on the merits of the criminal proceeding. We disagree.
Title 47 O.S. 1981 § 10-102 [47-10-102], the statute under which appellant was charged, provides punishment for the driver of any vehicle involved in a personal injury accident who willfully, maliciously, or feloniously fails to comply with the provisions of the statute. Ownership of the vehicle involved in such an accident is irrelevant to a charge under § 10-102. The State was required to prove that appellant was the driver of the car involved in the accident, not that he was the owner. Thus, appellant's admission to automobile ownership, even admitting ownership of the car in question, had no bearing on the crime charged. Accordingly, we find that appellant's right against self-incrimination was not abridged through the trial court's questions and subsequent finding of contempt.
The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED.
LANE, V.P.J., and BRETT, LUMPKIN and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
|