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BRAMLETTE v. CHARTER-MEDICAL-COLUMBIA6/18/1990
er asserts the intervening cause of Kim Stroud's negligence in stopping the hospital vehicle renders his own negligence a remote and not proximate cause of Bramlette's death. Under South Carolina law, the primary wrongdoer's action is a legal cause of an injury if either the intervening act or the injury itself was foreseeable as a natural and probable consequence of that action. Young v. Tide Craft, supra, citing Benford v. Berkeley Heating Co., 258 S.C. 357, 188 S.E.2d 841 (1972). As discussed above, respondent not only established causation in fact, she produced evidence establishing Bramlette's death was foreseeable as a natural and probable consequence of Dr. Pillinger's
Next, appellants contend Bramlette was contributorily negligent or assumed the risk as a matter of law because he was not insane and therefore acted knowingly when he killed himself. This Court has recognized a cause of action in negligence for breach of duty to prevent a known suicidal patient from committing suicide. Sloan v. Edgewood Sanatorium, Inc., 225 S.C. 1, 80 S.E.2d 348 (1954). Where such a duty exists, as here, clearly the very act which the defendant has a duty to prevent cannot constitute contributory negligence or assumption of the risk as a matter of law. Accord Cowan v. Doering, 215 N.J. Super. 484, 522 A.2d 444 (1987).
Finally, Charter Rivers asserts error in the trial judge's refusal to allow testimony by its undisclosed expert witness, Nurse Jenniver Savitz. As proffered, Nurse Savitz's testimony would have rebutted Dr. Kugler's testimony that Nurse Higdon breached the standard for care for a psychiatric nurse in failing to exercise her own discretion based on her personal knowledge of the patient.
It is well-settled that a ruling on the admission of evidence is within the trial judge's discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse thereof and a showing of prejudice. Manning v. City of Columbia, 297 S.C. 451, 377 S.E.2d 335 (1989). Despite specific deposition inquiries and supplemental discovery requests, Charter Rivers was never informed that Dr. Kugler had an opinion regarding the negligence of any employee other than Kim Stroud. Under these circumstances, it was error for the trial judge to exclude Nurse Savitz's testimony. Charter Rivers was clearly prejudiced by the exclusion of this evidence since Dr. Kugler's testimony on the issue of Nurse Higdon's negligence remained uncontradicted. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial as to Charter Rivers.
We dispose of appellants' remaining exceptions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. The judgment of the circuit court is
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
HARWELL, CHANDLER, FINNEY and TOAL, JJ., concur.
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