 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
MCKENNEY v. GREENE ACRES MANOR11/10/1994
senting opinion in Wilson, the Supreme Court has "abandon the rule that courts must identify and apply the statute of limitations of the state claim most closely analogous to the particular
§ 1983 claim," 471 U.S. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), in favor of a rule that "all § 1983 claims in a given state must be brought within a single set period." Id. at 285, 105 S.Ct. at 1952.
In Wilson, the Court concluded that the characterization of the section 1983 action is a federal question, 471 U.S. at 268-69, 105 S.Ct. at 1942-43, and that all section 1983 claims are characterized as claims for
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has had occasion to apply the Wilson rule to a section 1983 claim arising in Maine, holding that the residual six-year statute of limitations set forth in 14 M.R.S.A. § 752 (1980) "is the appropriate one to be used for section 1983 cases in the state of Maine." Small v. Inhabitants of the City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544, 546 (1st Cir. 1986). The First Circuit reasoned that it would be "inconsistent" with Wilson to conclude that a state statute of limitations applying to "select torts" is the appropriate one to adopt for section 1983 purposes. Id. at 548-49.
We are unpersuaded by the contention of Green Acres that this case should be governed by Maine's two year limitation period governing
Wilson, Owens, and Small teach that consistency and predictability are the paramount goals in determining the appropriate limitations period to apply to section 1983 claims. See Owens, 488 U.S. at 240, 109 S.Ct. at 576-77. Greene Acres maintains that there is consistency and predictability enough in holding that the two year limitations period in the
II.
In granting judgment on the pleadings to Greene Acres, the Superior Court relied on McKenney's failure to bring her action within the
The State does have an Eighth Amendment obligation to provide adequate medical care to inmates, and a private medical care provider under contract to meet that obligation on behalf of the State may be "`clothed with the authority under State law'" if the inmate is unable to seek necessary medical services from anyone other than the provider designated by the prison authorities. West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 55, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2258, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (citations omitted).
The fact that the health care provider is not an employee of the State does not relieve it of liability. Rather, it is the provider's function within the state system "that determines whether his actions can fairly be attributed to the State." Id. Likewise, and contrary to the argument of Greene Acres, it is not essential that the treatment be provided within the walls of the prison, so long as the care amounts to "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" of a prisoner. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
The allegations in the complaint, that a contractual relationship existed between Greene Acres and the Department of Corrections, that Dana McKenney was under treatment by Greene Acres pursuant to that contract, and that as a result of the facility's deliberate indifference to his medical needs, he suffered cruel or unusual punishment, state a sufficient section 1983 claim. See, e.g., United States v. Fayette County, Pennsylvania, 599 F.2d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1979) (complaints alleging deliberate indifference to inmate medical needs are liberally construed).
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
All concurring.
Page 1 2 Maine Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|